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Abstract 
Most commentators agree that the Schematism chapter plays a very important role in the 
Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). But there is little agreement on what role, exactly, the 
Schematism is supposed to play and how successfully it plays that role. Many 
commentators consider it a failure. My aim in this paper is to provide an interpretation of 
the role of the Schematism and a qualified defense of its main doctrines. The topic of the 
Schematism is the “subsumption” of objects under concepts, as the first sentence 
announces: “in all subsumptions of an object under a concept [. . .]“ (A137/B176). Its 
primary aim is to explain how it is possible for sensible objects to be subsumed 
specifically under the pure concepts of the understanding (categories). That much is 
relatively clear. However, “subsumption” admits of two different readings, which 
previous commentators have not carefully distinguished. In one sense, an object a can be 
said to be subsumed under a concept F just in case some subject thinks of a that it is F. In 
another sense, though, an object is only said to be subsumed under a concept when it 
instantiates that concept, e.g. when a is F. The first notion of subsumption is neutral on 
the truth of subsumption, whereas, on the second reading, subsumptions as such are true. 
In this paper I argue that this ambiguity in “subsumption” is the key that unlocks the 




Most commentators agree that the Schematism chapter plays a very important role in the 
Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). But that is where the agreement ends. In particular, there 
is little agreement on what role, exactly, the Schematism is supposed to play and how 
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successfully it plays that role. Many commentators consider it a failure.1 My aim in this 
paper is to provide an interpretation of the role of the Schematism and a qualified 
defense of its main doctrines. 
The topic of the Schematism is the “subsumption” of objects under concepts, as the 
first sentence announces: “in all subsumptions of an object under a concept [. . .]“ 
                                                
1 Prominent Schematism-bashers include Jacobi (“the most wonderful and mysterious of 
all unfathomable mysteries and wonders” – quoted by Schaper 1964, 270), Schopenhauer 
(“famous for its profound darkness, because nobody has yet been able to make sense of 
it” 1911, vol. 1, 533), Adickes (“in my opinion, the section on the Schematism is of no 
scientific value” Kant 1889, 171), Prichard (“it seems clear that if the first part [of the 
Analytic] is successful the second must be unnecessary” 1909, 246), Kemp Smith (“no 
such problem as Kant here refers to will exist” 1923, 334), Warnock (“but if this is [. . .] 
Kant’s question, he fails to answer it” 1948–9, 81), Bennett (“the incoherence of Kant’s 
problem of category-application is matched by the vacuity of his proposed solution” 
1966, 151), Wolff  (“the artificiality of the problem and the solution is evident upon 
reflection” 1969, 207), and Wilkerson (“the Schematism serves no useful purpose and 
can in my opinion be ignored without loss” 1976, 94). Guyer offers a more mixed 
verdict: “only in the case of the three relational categories does there seem to be a 
genuine possibility that any persuasive connection can be drawn” (1987, 175). More 
recent commentators tend to be more sanguine; see Pendlebury 1995 and Allison 2003, 
202–228 for sympathetic reconstructions. 
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(A137/B176).2 Is primary aim is to explain how it is possible for sensible objects to be 
subsumed, specifically, under the pure concepts of the understanding (categories).3 That 
much is relatively clear. However, “subsumption” admits of two different readings, 
which previous commentators have not carefully distinguished. In one sense, an object a 
can be said to be subsumed under a concept F just in case some subject thinks of a that it 
is F. In another sense, though, an object is only said to be subsumed under a concept 
when it instantiates that concept, e.g. when a is F. The first notion of subsumption is 
neutral on the truth of subsumption, whereas, on the second reading, subsumptions as 
                                                
2 The Critique of Pure Reason is cited in the customary fashion: the page number in the 
1781 edition (A) followed by the page number in the 1787 edition (B). Kant’s other 
works are cited by volume and page number in the Akademie edition, Kant 1902–. 
“Refl.” refers to Reflexionen, Kant’s unpublished handwritten notes, which can be found 
in volumes 14–19 of the Akademie edition. The CPR is quoted from the Guyer & Wood 
translation (Kant 1998a), with my modifications. 
3 In this essay, I only discuss “determining” or “subsumptive” schemata (by which 
sensible objects are subsumed under corresponding concepts), the topic of the 
Schematism chapter of the CPR, rather than schematism by analogy or symbol (5:351–
2). Neither do I discuss the “schematism” of the moral law (5:68–70), the pure concept 
of right (23:273-5), the duties of virtue (6:398), or the Ideas of reason and their 
associated regulative principles (A665/B693, A674/B702, A682/B710), much less the 
imagination “schematizing without a concept” in aesthetic judgment (A684/B712). A 
comprehensive account of Kant’s general notion of “schematism,” and its applications in 
various domains, is a project for future work. 
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such are true.4 If we make this distinction precise, we get two different questions that 
might be the question of the Schematism: 
(1) The subsumption1 of an object a under 
a concept F is the thought that a 
instantiates F (the thought that Fa).  
 
(Q1)  How is it possible to think of a 
sensible object that it falls under a 
category (where F is a category, to 
think a thought whose content is Fa)?  
(2) The subsumption2 of an object a under 
a concept F is the object’s instantiating 
that concept, thus the content of the 
thought involved in the corresponding 
subsumption1 (Fa) being true. 
(Q2)  How is it possible for sensible 
objects to instantiate categories 
(where F is a category, how is it 
possible that Fa)?5  
 
Kant sometimes talks about the “application” (Anwendung) of concepts to objects,6 and 
some commentators follow him by talking about schemata as “application conditions” 
for the categories, but “application” admits of the same ambiguity: is satisfaction of the 
application conditions for concept F sufficiently merely to think of an object as falling 
under F (to think that Fa) or is satisfaction of those conditions sufficient for a to 
instantiate F (for it to be the case that Fa)? This distinction between two notions of 
“application” mirrors precisely the distinction between subsumption1 and subsumption2. 
                                                
4 Since we are concerned only with the subsumption of sensible objects, and hence with 
objects of cognition, this agrees with Kant’s official definition of truth at A58/B82. 
5 Where the expression “Fa” abbreviates “object a falls under/instantiates concept F.” 
6 E.g. “How, then, is the subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts, the application 
of a category to appearances, possible?” (A138/B177). 
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Some previous commentators have focused on the “semantic” question (Q1),7 others on 
the “metaphysical” question (Q2),8 but have not carefully distinguished them.9, 10 
                                                
7 E.g. “we are, then, asking in our schematism question [. . .] for the rules which specify 
the conditions under which [whether this or that is a causal connection] could ever be a 
question” (Pippin 1976, 161; emphasis in original); “this raises issues concerning the 
possibility of intentional content” (Pendlebury 1995, 777; Au’s emphasis); “ ‘applying a 
category’ then means claiming for a discursive combination objective validity, validity 
not only ‘for myself, in my present state of perception’ but ‘for everybody, always’” 
(Longuenesse 1998, 244; Au’s emphasis) 
8 E.g. “the problem is not a new one, but simply Plato’s problem of giving an account of 
how it is possible to subsume a concrete particular under a thoroughly abstract universal” 
(Chipman 1972, 43); “the chief objective of the Schematism must therefore be to show 
how exactly these categories can be instantiated or manifested in our sensible intuitions 
of objects” (Guyer 1987, 158). 
9 A notable exception to the trend of conflating Q1 and Q2 is W.H. Walsh, whose 
distinction between a weaker and a stronger sense in which categories might have “sense 
and significance” roughly parallels my Q1 and Q2 (Walsh 1957, 97). Walsh interprets 
the problem of the Schematism as Q2, without connecting it, as I do, to Q1. As a result, 
he is unable to give a satisfactory reconstruction of the argument of the Schematism.  
10 Some scholars even read the Schematism as concerning the epistemic problem of how 
we know that objects instantiate categories or how we “recognize” them under categories 
(Krausser 1976; Dicker 2004, 213). I take it to be clear, though, that the epistemic 
problem is downstream of both Q1 and Q2: to know that an object falls under a concept, 
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In this paper I will argue that this ambiguity in “subsumption” is the key that unlocks 
the argument of the Schematism.11 I agree with many commentators that Kant’s ultimate 
aim in the Schematism is to explain the real possibility of the subsumption2 of sensible 
objects under categories (to answer Q2). He does so by explaining the possibility of the 
subsumption2 of sensible objects under schemata. This much is relatively 
uncontroversial.12 But Kant’s explanation of the possibility of subsuming2 objects under 
schemata will issue in an answer to Q2 only if there is a connection between subsuming2 
an object under a schema and subsuming2 it under the corresponding category. I think 
                                                                                                                                           
I must be able to subsume1 and subsume2 it under that concept, but not vice versa. I will 
ignore the epistemic question in what follows.  
11 The Schematism chapter is not the only text where Kant discusses the mediating 
representations (schemata) by means of which sensible objects are subsumed under 
categories; he discusses them elsewhere in the CPR (A163/B204, A181/B223–4, A245, 
A247/B304, A665/B693, A286/B342, A553/B581, A664/B692, A682/B710, 
A718/B746) in other writings (4:316, 495; 5:68-9; 20:212, 232, 274), and in some 
unpublished Reflections (Refl. 5552, 5933, 6359) and letters (11:316, 12:224–5). But the 
Schematism is by far the most extensive and informative discussion of transcendental 
schemata in Kant’s entire corpus. 
12 My strong suspicion is that even the commentators quoted in note 7 would agree that 
the ultimate aim of the Schematism is to explain the possibility of subsumption2 (Q2); 
however, because they do not make explicit how they understand “subsumption” (or 
“application”) it is hard to say for certain.   
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this connection is established by means of the notion of subsumption1 and a connection 
between subsumption1 and subsumption2, namely: 
Subsumption  Link: if subsuming1 an object under a concept F is sufficient to subsume1 
that very object under a concept F* then explaining the real possibility of the 
subsumption2 of objects under F is sufficient to explain the real possibility of the 
subsumption2 of objects under F*. 
This principle might appear complicated, but, I think, it expresses a straightforward truth. 
If I can prove the real possibility of sensible objects instantiating F (being subsumed2 
under F) then I can prove the real possibility that Fx (for at least some sensible object x). 
But if the thought that Fx is sufficient for the thought that F*x (subsuming1 x under F is 
sufficient for subsuming1 x under F*) then by proving the real possibility that Fx I have 
thereby proved the real possibility that F*x. For example, since <gold> contains 
<yellow> as a mark, subsuming1 an object under <gold> is sufficient to subsume1 it 
under <yellow>; consequently, proving the real possibility of an object being subsumed2 
under <gold> is sufficient to prove the real possibility of an object being subsumed2 
under <yellow>. If I am right that this principle plays a key role in reconstructing Kant’s 
argument in the Schematism, this will vindicate my claim that the distinction between 
subsumption1 and subsumption2 (and thus the distinction between Q1 and Q2) are key to 
understanding this chapter of the CPR.  
Where G is a mark of F, subsuming1 an object under F is analytically sufficient for 
subsuming1 under G. Subsumption Link will be of interest only if we can find instances 
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of non-analytic sufficiency of subsumption1 under categories.13 I will argue that this is 
precisely what the Schematism provides: subsuming1 an object under a schema is 
sufficient (thought not analytically sufficient because the category is not a mark of the 
schema) for subsuming1 it under the corresponding category. Consequently, the task of 
explaining the real possibility of objects being subsumed2 under categories is reducible 
to the task of explaining the real possibility of their being subsumed2 under the 
corresponding schemata.  
Schemata thus play two crucial roles in Kant’s proof of the real possibility of the 
subsumption2 of sensible objects under categories. On the one hand, they help establish 
that: 
Subsumption Sufficiency: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under the schema of a 
concept is sufficient for subsuming1 that object under that concept.14 
After some preliminaries (§§1–2), in Part One I reconstruct Kant’s theory of schemata, 
focusing on explaining why Subsumption Sufficiency holds. The guiding thread of my 
                                                
13 Analytic sufficiency will not help for it would require finding concepts of which the 
categories are marks; explaining the possibility of subsuming objects under those 
“enlarged” concepts would require explaining the possibility of subsuming objects under 
their marks, the categories, the very problem with which we started. See §2 for more 
discussion of this issue. 
14 If we read “application” as application1/subsumption1 this corresponds to Kant’s claim 
that “an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the 
transcendental time-determination which, as the schema of the concept of the 
understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former” (A139/B178). 
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interpretation is Kant’s claim that schemata are “transcendental time-determinations.” 
After specifying what notion of “determination” is involved in this claim (§3), I explain 
why the schemata of empirical concepts (§4) and mathematical concepts (§5) are time-
determinations, and why the schemata of categories are transcendental time-
determinations (§6). The conclusion of Part One is that, for each kind of concept and 
their associated schemata, Subsumption Sufficiency holds. 
In the much shorter Part Two I explain Kant’s justification for: 
Real Possibility: there is an explanation of the real possibility of the subsumption2 of 
sensible objects under schemata of empirical concepts, mathematical concepts, and 
categories. 
In the case of empirical and mathematical concepts I argue (§7) these explanations are 
nearly direct consequences of the theory of schemata outlined in Part One and some 
relatively uncontroversial features of Kant’s cognitive theory. In the case of categories, 
though, the explanation is not significantly more difficult. I argue in §8 that the real 
possibility of subsuming sensible objects under categorical schemata follows almost 
immediately from Kant’s specification of those schemata. Subsumption Link, 
Subsumption Sufficiency, and Real Possibility allow Kant to conclude that: 
Conclusion: there is an explanation of the real possibility of the subsumption2 of 
sensible objects under categories. 
This is precisely the conclusion for which the Schematism, on my interpretation, 
constitutes an argument. This establishes that, on my reading, the argument of the 
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Schematism is valid.15 Whether it is sound depends on the strength of the arguments 
Kant gives in favor of the premises. I will argue that Kant’s detailed theory of schemata 
provides a plausible case for the truth of these premises. Thus, I will argue, the 
Schematism to a large extent succeeds in its aims.16 But we can only see this if we 
explicitly distinguish subsumption1 and the “semantic” question Q1 from subsumption2 
and the “metaphysical” question Q2.17 
 
Preliminaries 
Before proceeding to the core of the argument in Part One, I clarify some key 
preliminary notions. 
 
                                                
15 None of the commentators I am aware of (see Bibliography at the end) reconstruct the 
Schematism as an argument. Even George Dicker, who is otherwise so meticulous in 
formally reconstructing Kant’s arguments, abandons this methodology when it comes to 
the Schematism (Dicker 2004, 213–224). 
16 To this extent I agree with Allison 2004, 202–228. However, I provide detailed 
reconstruction of the argument of the Schematism, which Allison does not. 
17 This paper covers most of the main topics, and many of the details, of the Schematism. 
One topic that is salient by its absence is the imagination. Kant writes that “the schema is 
in itself always only a product of the imagination” (A140/B179). For reasons of space, I 
omit here my detailed interpretation of imagination and its relation to schemata (and 
time-determination). Two interpretations of Kant’s theory of the imagination that 




Kant sometimes uses “subsumption” to refer to a relation between concepts: one concept 
is said to be “subsumed” under a more general concept (e.g. <human> under 
<animal>).18 However, in the Schematism he is concerned with subsumption as a 
relation between an object and a concept (e.g. subsuming Socrates under <human>); the 
very first sentence of the Schematism chapter begins “in all subsumption of an object 
under a concept [. . .]” (A137/B176; Au’s emphasis). I will refer to the latter as object 
subsumption and the former as concept subsumption. This distinction can be drawn 
within either subsumption1 or subsumption2. We can distinguish between the thought 
that an object falls under a concept and the thought that one concept falls under another 
(subsumption1). Likewise, we can distinguish between the fact that an object falls under 
a concept and the fact that one concept falls under another concept (subsumption2).19 
Until Part Two, unless otherwise noted, when “subsumption” appears without a modifier, 
it always refers to object subsumption1. 
The logical form of object subsumption is simple: a is subsumed under F, or, in 
contemporary symbolism Fa. The logical form of concept subsumption is, I take it, the 
logical form of judgment in general, which Kant specifies in the Jäsche logic as follows: 
“to everything x, to which the concept of body (a + b) belongs, belongs also attraction 
                                                
18 For instance, in his discussions of subsumption in syllogistic reasoning: A301/B357, 
A304–5/B361, A308/B364. 
19 For further discussion of these two different uses of “subsumption” see Longuenesse 
1998, 92–97, and de Boer 2016, 451. 
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(c)” (Jäsche Logic, 9:111).20 In contemporary symbolism, the subsumption of concept F 
under concept G has this logical form: (x)(Fx → Gx). In the case of an analytic 
subsumption (subsuming one concept under a concept of which it is a mark), G will be a 
constituent of F; in the case of synthetic subsumption (subsuming one concept under a 
concept which is not one of its marks), G will not be a constituent of F, but the logical 
form of the subsumption will still be (x)(Fx → Gx). All of the objects subsumed under F 
are also subsumed under G.  If I am right that the logical form of object subsumption is 
Fa then this means that object subsumption is already “built into” the logical form of 
judgment (concept subsumption). The role of judgment, after all, is to relate concepts 
which can be used to subsume objects.21, 22 
                                                
20 This is specifically the form of synthetic judgment because Kant uses the variables “(a 
+ b)” and “(c)” to indicate that a and b are not marks of c. If we relax that requirement 
(the mere form of the symbols is non-committal about mark-inclusion) we can use this as 
the form of judgment in general, both analytic and synthetic.  
21  The same point can be drawn out of the quoted passage: “to everything x, to which the 
concept of body (a + b) belongs” already involves a universal quantifier “to everything 
x” and an object subsumption “to which the concept of body (a + b) belongs.” Cf. 
Longuenesse 1998, 87. 
22 I thus depart from Allison 2004, 212, who takes the problem of subsumption to be the 
problem of how judgments are possible. On my reading, subsumption is a necessary 
condition on judgments relating to objects, but one can make judgments (concept-
subsumptions) involving concepts under which no object can be subsumed1. 
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What objects are available to us to be subsumed under concepts? Given the logical 
form of object subsumption, what values can be substituted for x in the form Fx? When I 
subsume an object under a concept I am not subsuming a general class of objects under 
that concept (that would be concept subsumption), I am subsuming a specific object. To 
the question “which object is subsumed”? the answer must always be a single object. 
This means that subsumption involves a singular aspect as well as a general aspect (the 
concept under which the object is subsumed).23 Intuitions, in virtue of being singular 
representations, are the source of our ability to represent single objects. Consequently, to 
subsume an object under a concept I must be able to intuit that object.24 If I cannot intuit 
objects of a certain kind then I may be able to have general thoughts about them (I can 
engage in concept subsumption involving concepts of them) but I cannot think de re of a 
single one of them that it falls under a concept. I cannot engage in object subsumption 
with respect to that kind of object. The objects we can intuit are what Kant calls 
“phenomena,” objects of sensible spatiotemporal intuition. Thus, in talking about object 
                                                
23 This does not mean that “universal” object subsumptions are impossible (e.g. “to 
everything x, to which the concept of body (a + b) belongs”) but that they are parasitic 
on the ability to subsume individual objects under concepts (“the concept of body (a + b) 
belongs to x”). 
24  My interpretation of intuition agrees, in broad outlines, with that of Allais 2015, while 
remaining neutral on her more controversial claims (e.g. the independence of intuition 
from understanding). See Stang (2016) for some differences between my reading of 
transcendental idealism and Allais’s. 
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subsumption I will always  mean the subsumption of spatiotemporal objects under 
concepts.25  
                                                
25 This means that I can think whole judgments involving concepts like <noumena> (e.g. 
that noumena causally affect us) but for no noumenon x can I think a thought of the form 
Fx. I anticipate two objections. First, Kant allows us to think about God and <God> is 
not a general concept (there is at most one God) so this might appear to be an object 
subsumption involving a noumenon (God cannot be intuited by us). That there can be at 
most one God does not mean, however, that a thought about God has the form Fa (where 
“a” refers to God); it means that the concept of God is so determinate that it can be 
instantiated by at most one object. Nonetheless, thoughts about God remain concept 
subsumptions, not object subsumptions (their logical from is: (x)(God(x) → Fx)). 
Secondly, Kant allows that we I can think of myself as a noumenon. Here we must 
distinguish between theoretical and practical representation. Within theoretical 
philosophy I think that all of our thoughts about ourselves as thinking substances 
underlying our mental lives are concept subsumptions (e.g. “to everything x, to which the 
concept <substance underling my thought-predicates> belongs, belongs also 
<simplicity>”). In practical cognition, though, we can represent ourselves de re as 
noumena through the awareness of ourselves as bound by the moral law. I take this to 
involve something like the practical analogue of a singular representation. In this paper I 
am focusing solely on theoretical contexts where such de re noumenal representation is 
impossible. For a compelling account of the source of our practical awareness of 
ourselves as noumena, see Schafer Forthcoming. 
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My discussion up to this point implicitly presupposed that “subsumption” means 
subsumption1 but all of the issues I raised can also be raised about subsumption2. We can 
distinguish between facts of the form (x)(Fx → Gx) and those of the form Fx, and we ask, 
of those objects x which we can intuit, how it is possible for a fact of the form Fx to 
obtain? 
 
§2. Categories and Schemata 
 
In trying to understand Kant’s explanation of the possibility of the subsumption (in 
either sense) of objects under categories it is helpful to think about the negative case 
where Kant thinks that such subsumption is impossible: non-sensible objects or 
“noumena.”  In the Phenomena and Noumena section Kant writes: “if this condition of 
judgment (schema) is missing, then all subsumption disappears; for then nothing would 
be given that could be subsumed under the concept” (A247/B304). Subsuming1 an object 
under a category, without its schemata, is impossible. Because schemata relate categories 
exclusively to sensible objects, this means no subsumption1 of a non-sensible object 
under a category (or any concept for that matter) is possible.26  
                                                
26 But this does not entail that the subsumption2 of individual noumena under categories 
is impossible. It entails that Kant’s strategy for explaining the possibility of the 
subsumption2 of sensible objects under categories cannot work for noumena. Since Kant 
(with his characteristic modesty) takes this to be the only possible such explanation, he 
takes the subsumpion2 of categories under noumena (their instantiation of categories) to 
be inexplicable. 
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Kant is not denying, though, that we can subsume concepts of non-sensible objects 
(e.g. <noumenon>) under other concepts (e.g. <non-spatiotemporal>), even categories 
(e.g. <cause-effect>), for his transcendental theory of experience requires precisely such 
concept-subsumptions (e.g. the thought that noumena are non-spatiotemporal and that 
noumena cause the matter of experience).27 As so-called “metaphysical” readers of Kant 
point out, the CPR is replete with claims that, in my terminology, are concept-
subsumptions involving concepts of non-sensible objects.28 These “noumenal thoughts” 
remain available to us, even if we cannot use their constituent concepts to subsume non-
sensible objects. 
It is clear that the categories as they appear in these thoughts are not identical to 
schemata and, what is more, these thoughts do not even involve application of the 
corresponding schemata. This has given rise, in the Kant literature, to talk about 
“unschematized” categories (a term Kant never uses)29 or “pure” categories (see 
A248/B304), i.e. categories that appear in thoughts (concept subsumptions) about non-
sensible objects and hence do not involve schemata. What, then, is the relation between 
                                                
27 For the former claim, see B307–8; for the latter, see especially 8:215, as well as the 
texts cited by Adickes 1924, ch. 3. 
28 E.g. Adickes 1924, Aquila 1979, Ameriks 1982, and Allais 2015. The presence of 
these noumenal thoughts is not proof that the “metaphysical” reading is correct, 
however. For a non-metaphysical take on, for instance, Kant’s talk of noumena affecting 
us, see Allison 2004, 64–73.  
29 This term appears to have been introduced into the Kant literature by Paton 1936, vol. 
2, 41. 
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so-called “pure categories” and schemata?30 
One tempting, but ultimately mistaken, model would take the unschematized or 
“pure” category to be a genus and the schemata to be a differentia within the relevant 
genus, so that the “schematized” category would be something like a species. For 
instance, the genus would be  <cause-effect> (“something that allows an inference to the 
existence of something else” – A243/B30131), the differentia would be the corresponding 
                                                
30 de Boer 2016 argues that “pure concepts of the understanding” already contain their 
own schemata (are already “schematized”), while “categories” are these pure concepts, 
abstracted from their schemata. While I have my doubts about whether this is accurate to 
Kant’s uses of these terms (de Boer’s reading is hard to square with Kant’s use of 
“category” at B128, A146/B185, A161/B201–2, A184/B227, A219/B266, A222/B269, 
and many other passages) even if de Boer is correct, my view can be easily translated 
into her terms as follows: where I say “unschematized category” substitute “category” 
simpliciter.  
31 A page earlier, at A242/B300, Kant distinguishes between the purely nominal 
definitions we can give of the categories in abstraction from their relation to sensible 
objects, and the real definitions that are possible in relation to such objects. In the case of 
each category he discusses, he identifies the possibility of the real definition of the 
category in its sensible use with its relation to time: quantity: “this how-many-times 
[Wievielmal] is grounded on successive repetition, thus on time” (A242/B300); reality: 
“reality, in contrast to negation, can be defined only if one thinks of a time (as the sum 
total of all being) that is either filled by it or empty” (A242/B300); substance: “if I leave 
out persistence (which is existence at all times)” (A242/B300); cause: “from the concept 
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schema (“the real upon which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows” –
A144/B183), and the “schematized category” would be the conjunction of the two: a 
cause is a real being (one possessed of an intensive degree of reality) whose existence 
posits, and from whose existence always follows according to a rule, the existence of a 
distinct real being, its effect. The problem with the species-genus model is that it fails to 
explain precisely what Kant wants to explain: the subsumption of a sensibly given object 
under the category. A differentia is one mark among others of a species-concept; e.g. 
<rational> is one mark, among others, of <human> (<rational animal>). Likewise, on 
the species-genus model, the schema is one mark among others of the schematized 
category. But in order to subsume an object under a concept one must subsume it under 
all of its marks, not merely one of them. The species-genus model fails to explain why, 
in subsuming the object under the schema (differentia), one thereby also subsumes it 
under the category (genus). It is akin to explaining the possibility of subsuming an object 
under <human> by citing merely the possibility of subsuming it under <rational>. 
The defender of the species-genus model might reply that this is part of the definition 
                                                                                                                                           
of a cause as a pure category (if I leave out the time in which something follows 
something else in accordance with a rule)” (A243/B301); contingency: “I would gladly 
know by what means you intend to cognize the possibility of this not-being, if you do not 
represent a succession in the series of appearances and in this succession an existence, 
which follows on the not-being (or conversely), and thus a change” (A243/B301). I take 
this to mean that the distinction Kant is drawing is between “pure” categories, 
abstracting from their temporal schemata, and schematized categories. See also A146-7, 
B186. 
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of a species-constituting differentia: it can only apply to instances of the genus (e.g. only 
animals can be rational).32 But this is to restate my point without responding to it: 
without a further explanation, the species-genus model fails to explain why the schema is 
a differentia, in this stronger sense, of that category, i.e. why anything that is subsumed 
under “the real upon which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows” is 
thereby subsumed  under <cause-effect>. And that is precisely what needs to be 
explained.33 
The schema cannot be identical to the unschematized category (this would render 
thoughts involving pure categories impossible), it cannot be a species-constituting 
differentia, and, more generally, it cannot be one of the marks of the schematized 
category. What other relation might obtain between schema and category? In this paper I 
will defend the following proposal: although the schema is not identical to the category, 
to subsume1 an object under a schema is sufficient to subsume1 it under the 
corresponding category. Schemata are vehicles of object subsumption1 for categories. 
This is the principle of Subsumption Sufficiency. Subsumption Sufficiency is secured, on 
my reading, because schemata are, in Kant’s words, “transcendental time-
determinations.” In Part One, I explain what this means, and why it secures Subsumption 
Sufficiency. 
 
                                                
32 See Anderson 2014, 123–5. 
33 To call schemata “application conditions” of categories is just to state my question, not 
to answer it. Why is satisfaction of the application-conditions (schema) of <cause> 





In exploring Kant’s argument for Subsumption Sufficiency, my guiding thread will be 
his claim at A139/B178 that the schema of a category is a “transcendental time-
determination”: “hence an application of the category to appearances becomes possible 
by means of the transcendental time-determination [transcendentale Zeitbestimmung], 
which, as the schema of the concept of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of 
the latter [appearances] under the former [the category]” (A139/B178). To unpack the 
notion of transcendental time-determinations we need to understand (i) what it means 
that schema are “transcendental,” (ii) what they have to do with time, and (iii) what it 
means that they are “determinations.” With respect to (i), for now I will merely point out 
that, in explaining how subsumption1 of objects under a priori concepts is possible, 
schemata of such concepts explain (on my reading) how subsumption2 of objects under 
such concepts is possible, and the possibility of subsumption2 is a necessary condition 
for cognition using those concepts (Bxxvi, footnote). Consequently, schemata, insofar as 
they explain the subsumption2 of objects under categories, will be transcendental in 
precisely Kant’s technical sense at A56/B80: they will explain (partly) how a priori 
cognition is possible. 34 I will return momentarily to (ii) their relation to time, but I will 
                                                
34 “[. . .] not every a priori cognition [Erkenntnis] must be called transcendental, rather 
only those through which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuitions or 
concepts) are applied merely a priori  or are possible (i.e. the possibility of cognition or 
its use a priori).” Cf. Allison 2004, 216. 
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begin by examining (iii), the respect in which schemata are determinations 
(Bestimmungen). 
We should distinguish at least four different senses of “determination” that are 
relevant to Kant’s investigations. Each of these is a sense the German word 
“Bestimmung” and its cognates (bestimmen, bestimmt, bestimmtheit, unbestimmt, 
unbestimmtheit, etc.) can have.35, 36  
Determination-1 is the semantic notion of a representation representing its object as 
determinately having or lacking a predicate (being determinate with respect to that 
predicate).  Indeterminacy1 is the notion of a representation that represents its object 
neither as having nor as lacking a predicate. Conceptual representation, being general, is 
typically indeterminate1 to some degree.37  Determination1 is a gradable notion; one 
representation can be more determinate1 than another in virtue of representing its objects 
as possessing a wider range of predicates (e.g. a species-concept is more determinate1 
                                                
35 One difference between English and German is that German does not have different 
words for “determined” and “determinate”; both correspond to “unbestimmt.” 
36 Stang 2012 contains a preliminary version of these distinctions. 
37 A concept is completely determinate1 just in case, for every predicate F, it either 
contains F or ~F. Our concepts are typically incompletely determinate1, the possible 
exception being <God>, for it is completely determinate1 at least with respect to God’s 
intrinsic properties. Conceptual representation, in general, is not completely 
determinate1.  For extensive discussion of complete determination1 see Kant’s lectures 
(28: 413, 503, 554, 630, 722–4, 779, 1156) and Reflexionen (Refl. 5760, 5783, 5784, 
5786, 6245, 6255, 6290, and 6322) on metaphysics. 
 22 
than a genus-concept). Determination1 will play a key role in the argument of this paper; 
I will sometimes refer to it as “semantic” determination (likewise “semantic” 
indeterminacy is indeterminacy1). 
Determination-2 is the metaphysical notion of an object determinately having or lacking 
a predicate (being determinate with respect to that predicate). It is the notion involved in 
the “principle of complete determination,” according to which every object is fully 
determinate with respect to every predicate (it either determinately has or determinately 
lacks it).38 Indeterminacy2 is the notion of an object neither determinately having nor 
lacking a predicate (which may or may not be possible). Determination2 is gradable; one 
object may be more determinate2 than another in virtue of being determinate2 with 
respect to a wider range of predicates. Determination2 will also play a key role in the 
argument of this paper; I will sometimes refer to it as “metaphysical” determination 
(likewise, “metaphysical” indeterminacy refers to indeterminacy2). 
Determination-3 is also a metaphysical notion, closely tied to the notion of a determining 
ground.  An object is said to be determined3 with respect to a predicate just in case there 
is a determining ground of its possessing that predicate.39 A determining ground of an 
                                                
38 See Kant’s discussion of this principle at A573/B601, as well as Stang (2012). 
39 A determining ground is one that not only brings about its consequence but does so 
necessarily: it is impossible that a determining ground, in the very same context, would 
“posit” a different consequence (or fail to posit any consequence). The notion of a 
determining ground (and its difference from a merely sufficient ground, which may posit 
different consequences in different contexts) is important primarily in the context of 
debates about free will, in particular, whether the will is a determining ground of its acts, 
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object’s possession of a predicate is an entity such that, necessarily, if the same 
background conditions obtain, it grounds the possession of that predicate by that object. 
Determination3 will not be further discussed in this paper (though it has a claim equal to 
determination2 to be called “metaphysical” determination). I mention it only to 
distinguish it from other notions of determination. 
Determination-4 is an epistemic notion. An object is determined4 with respect to a 
predicate by an agent just in case that agent knows that object has or lacks that 
predicate.40 An object is said to be indeterminate4 with respect to a predicate when it is 
epistemically open, for an agent, whether or not the object has that predicate. 
Determination4 will not be further discussed in this paper. I mention it only to distinguish 
it from other notions of determination. 
While determination1 and determination2 are distinct notions, they are closely 
connected in Kant’s philosophy. Because “the conditions of the possibility of the 
                                                                                                                                           
or merely a sufficient ground. The distinction is originally due to Crusius, in his 1763 
work Dissertatio de usu et limitibus principii rationis determinantis, vulgo sufficientis 
(Crusius 1964, vol. 4, §§I, III, XX). Kant notes this distinction with approval in the pre-
Critical Nova dilucidatio (1:398), although he later distances himself from it in his 
metaphysics lectures (28:14, 30, 54, 401, 491; 29: 808, 809, 815, 819). For critical 
discussion see Hogan (2009) and Stang (2019). 
40 Determination4 could be extended to include other epistemic states less demanding 
that knowledge (e.g. Kant’s notion of Glaube). However, since this notion of 
determination will play a minimal small role in this paper, I will leave it at that. See 
Chignell (2007) for an account of different kinds of epistemic states in Kant. 
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experience of objects [determinately1 representing them as, e.g. substances and causes] 
are the conditions of possible objects of experience [their determinately2 being 
substances and causes] (A493/B521), they are determinate2 (at least with respect to the 
range of predicates representable in experience) only insofar as we determinately1 
represent them. 
Having made some preliminary distinctions among different notions of determination, 
we must now ask: in which (if any) of these four senses are schemata transcendental 
time-determinations? On my reading (see Introduction) the primary role of the 
Schematism is to establish a thesis about the subsumpion2 of objects under categories 
(Conclusion) by means of a premise about subsumption1 (Subsumption Sufficiency). 
Subsumption1 involves determinacy1: to subsume1 an object under a concept is to 
determine1 that object with respect to that concept. To subsume2 an object under a 
concept, by contrast, that concept must represent the object as having features the object 
determinately2 has.41 Determination2 will thus become relevant when we reconstruct 
Kant’s argument for the claim that it is really possible for objects to be subsumed2 under 
schemata (Real Possibility) and thus under categories (via Subsumption Link).  While 
determination3 (having a determining ground) is not strictly irrelevant it is decidedly 
secondary to this project.42 So is determination4 (being epistemically determined). The 
                                                
41  See the opening of the Schematism at A137/B176. 
42 For one thing, one of the categories <cause-effect> is the category by which we think 
of one object being determined3 by another; for another, the determinacy1 (content) of 
our representations determines3 (grounds) objects as determinate2 (having properties) and 
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question of how we know objects to fall under a set of concepts (determining4 them with 
respect to those concepts) cannot arise unless we assume that those concepts can be 
representationally determinate1 with respect to properties sensible objects have 
(determination2).43  
I can now offer a first-pass characterization of my interpretation of schemata as 
transcendental time-determinations: schemata explain the possibility of determinately1 
representing a sensibly given object under a category (subsuming1 it under the category). 
They do so by determinately1 representing the specifically temporal features of objects.44 
                                                                                                                                           
thus allows us to determine4 (know) them a priori. (I promise the reader this is the only 
sentence in this paper in which all four notions of determination are involved!) 
43 More indirectly, Kant makes clear that schemata make possible cognition (Erkenntnis) 
of objects using categories rather than knowledge (Wissen) that they fall under 
categories. While there is, as of yet, no consensus among scholars what “cognition” 
(Erkenntnis) is, there is a growing awareness that it is crucial to distinguish it from 
knowledge (Wissen); see Smit 2000, Hanna 2006, Watkins and Willaschek 2017, and 
Schafer Forthcoming. Kant’s investigation into the possibility of cognizing objects using 
categories is not thereby an investigation into the possibility of knowing (determining4) 
that objects fall under categories. 
44 By contrast, Henry Allison gives the following definition: “we may preliminarily 
characterize a transcendental time-determination as a rule-governed product of the 
figurative synthesis (a “transcendental product of the imagination”), which exhibits in a 
non-discursive manner the form of unity conceptually expressed in a category” (Allison 
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Why determinately1 representing the temporal features of objects should have anything 
to do with determinately1 representing them as falling under categories (subsuming1 
them under categories) is one of the main things I shall have to explain in this paper. 
Until further notice, “(in)determinate/determinacy/determination” will refer to the 
relevant forms of determination1. 
At the risk of introducing yet a further distinction, I think it will aid our 
comprehension of Kant’s discussion if we distinguish, within determination, what I will 
call the agent of determination (the determining representation) and the patient of 
determination (the determined object). For instance, as I progressively determine my 
concept of matter (e.g. through physical investigation), my concept becomes further 
determinate and is thus an agent by which I further determine matter, the patient of 
determination. The agent of determination in our case is two-fold: the schema (it 
determinately represents the temporal features of objects) and the category (we are 
explaining how it comes to be able to determinately subsume objects). But what is the 
patient? 
Schemata can mediate between pure intellectual concepts and sensibly given objects, 
Kant writes, because they are “homogenous” with both (A138/B177). They are 
homogenous with sensibly given objects because “time is contained in every empirical 
representation of the manifold” (A139/B178). It is important to realize that “contained 
in” (enthalten in) cannot mean “contained in the content of” because time is the form of 
                                                                                                                                           
2004, 215). I do not think this characterization is false, but I think my characterization is 
more explanatory. 
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inner sense45 (as Kant reminds us earlier in the same paragraph) and thus outer sense 
intuitions are not as such intuitions of objects as temporal.46 In fact, Kant will have to do 
some very intricate work in the Analogies and the Refutation of Idealism to demonstrate 
both the possibility and necessity of representing outer objects as also being in time.47 At 
this point, in the Schematism, before he has done that work, Kant can only assume that 
representations of outer objects are in time (because all representations, as states in us, 
are in time).48 Hence it might have been more perspicuous if Kant had written: “every 
empirical representation of the manifold [is contained in time]” (A139/B178).  
                                                
45 “Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e. of the intuition of ourselves 
and our state [Zustand]” (A49/B50). 
46  “Time cannot be a determination of outer appearances: it belongs neither to shape nor 
location etc., but rather determines the relation of representations in our inner state” 
(A33/B49–50).  
47  I read Kant’s discussion of “time determination” in the Analogies (A183/B226, 
A185/B228, A188/B231, A215/B262, A217/B264) and the Refutation (B275–8), 
continuous with my reading of the Schematism, as concerning the conditions of the 
possibility of determinately1 representing the temporal relations of outer objects 
(permanence, succession, simultaneity), which, given that these objects are mere 
appearances, are at the same time conditions of the possibility of their determinately2 
standing in those temporal relations. 
48 See A34/B50–1. My reading is in some tension with the conclusion of that paragraph: 
“from the principle of inner sense I can say entirely generally: all appearances in general, 
i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in relations of time.” This 
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Schemata mediate categories with appearances because, as time-determinations, they 
are “homogenous” with appearances. But if appearances are in time (at this point in the 
CPR) only in the indirect sense that the sensible representations by which those 
appearances are given to us (intuitions) are in time, then schemata mediate categories 
with appearances by mediating categories with intuitions of appearances. Time is the 
“medium” of this mediation because all representations, as states of ours, are in time. 
Schemata, as mediating representations, are specifically time-determinations, because 
they further determine objects in respect of temporal features. But which objects? What 
is the patient of determination here? It cannot be, at this point in the CPR, that they 
immediately determine outer objects in respect of time, for Kant has not yet built the 
                                                                                                                                           
can be read as making either a weak or a strong claim about the temporality of all 
appearances überhaupt (including outer ones): (i) all appearances, even outer ones, are in 
time in the minimal sense that our intuitions of them are in time (weak), or (ii) all 
appearances, even outer ones, not merely our intuitions of them, are in time (strong). On 
the weak reading, Kant is entitled to this claim at this point in the Aesthetic, but the weak 
reading does not fit the text very well (Kant emphasizes that it is the objects of 
representation, not merely the states in us by which we represent them, that are in time). 
The strong reading is more natural to the text, but it is a non sequitur, for it does not 
follow from what Kant says earlier in the paragraph. I think the sentence must be read in 
the strong way, but as anticipating an argument Kant will give later, in the Analogies and 
the Refutation of Idealism. Bader 2017 offers a fascinating, and very different, account 
of why outer objects are in time, but one not very closely tied to the letter of the text. 
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machinery for doing so (primarily, the Analogies).49 Instead, schemata immediately 
determine the inner states by which such objects are given to us (intuitions, which qua 
states in us are in time). Specifically, they determine the temporal properties of those 
states.50  
 At a first approximation, then, we can say that schemata are transcendental time-
determinations insofar as: (i) they allow us to determine1 objects with respect to 
categories by allowing us to subsume1 sensibly given objects under them; (ii) they do so 
by determinately1 representing temporal relations among the states by which these 
objects are given to us (intuitions). The question is: why, in doing (ii), do schemata also 
do (i)? 
 
§4. Empirical Schemata as Time-determinations 
 
Schemata of categories are transcendental time-determinations. In building up to a more 
complete characterization of what that means, I am going to start by considering the 
schemata of empirical concepts, a topic Kant introduces and briefly discusses at 
A141/B180. Categorial schemata are mediating representations that make possible the 
subsumption of given objects under categories, while schemata of empirical concepts 
(henceforth, empirical schemata) make possible the subsumption of given objects under 
                                                
49 And the schemata will themselves play an important role in showing how the time-
determination of outer objects is possible, for the Analogies involve the time-
schematized relational categories as. See A181/B223–4. 
50 On this point I agree with Allison 2004, 217. 
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empirical concepts.51 Hence empirical schemata are not transcendental but, as schemata, 
they are still time-determinations. This is indirectly confirmed in the text of the 
Schematism itself: “[an empirical concept] always refers immediately to a schema of the 
imagination as a rule for the determination of our intuition, in accordance with a certain 
general concept” (A141/B180). “A rule for the determination of our intuition” is, I take 
it, a rule for determining intuitions as temporally ordered states in us, rather than a rule 
for determining the object of that intuition (subsuming1 it under a concept), though of 
course Kant needs to show that the former will explain the latter.  
                                                
51 There is a debate in the secondary literature (see Pendlebury 1955; Chipman 1972; 
Pippin 1976; Guyer 1987; Matherne 2015) on whether empirical concepts are identical to 
their schemata. Even if, contra Chipman 1972, it is impossible to possess an empirical 
concept without being able to subsume a sensible object under it, it does not follow that 
they are identical, merely that they are necessarily co-occurring. The view that empirical 
concepts are their own schemata fits poorly with Kant’s principal discussion of them: 
“Even less does an object of experience or an image of it ever reach the empirical 
concept, rather the latter is always related immediately to the schema of the imagination, 
as a rule for the determination of our intuition in accordance with a certain general 
concept. The concept of a dog signifies [bedeutet] a rule in accordance with which my 
imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general [. . .]” (A141/B180). 
If an empirical concept is its own schema then, by the second sentence, it signifies 
[bedeutet] itself, which is rather awkward. 
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But what does applying an empirical concept to an object (especially an outer object) 
have to do with representing our intuition of that object as temporally determinate? 
Kant’s example of a dog is not especially helpful: “the concept of a dog designates a 
rule, according to which my imagination can draw the shape [Gestalt] of a four-footed 
animal, without being restricted to any particular shape [Gestalt] that experience may 
have offered me or any possible image [Bild] which I can present in concreto” 
(A141/B180). One thing that is notable about this example is that Kant has, in effect, 
“mathematized” the schema of the concept of a dog by thinking of it as a schema for 
drawing a certain shape in space, albeit an empirically-specified shape rather than a 
purely geometrical one. He has partially assimilated it to the schema of a geometrical 
concept. However, I think Kant’s example of the schema of the concept <dog>, if 
thought through more fully, contains the materials to understand better, not only 
schemata of empirical concepts but mathematical and categorial schemata as well.  
Subsuming a sensibly given object under the concept <dog> is thinking of that object 
as a dog. But, as Kant is fully aware, to think of an object as a dog is not merely to think 
of it as having a certain shape.52 The concept <dog> is not the concept <dog-shaped 
object>, for an object could be a dog-shaped cat or a dog-shaped pile of wood. A dog is 
an object with a certain kind of history, a certain kind of life. In an Aristotelian vein, we 
could say that a dog is a being with a certain nature, one that dictates how it changes and 
develops over the course of time and in the right environment. The form of the dog is an 
inner principle of change by which it assimilates nutrients from the environment, 
                                                
52 If it were, Kant could have saved himself a lot of trouble in the Critique of 
Teleological Judgment! 
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maintains its internal constitution, grows into maturity, decays, and dies. These are 
considerations relevant to answering the question “what is a dog?” Kant, however, is 
concerned with the semi-transcendental question, “what is it to represent something as a 
dog?”53 But we can transform these object-oriented answers into answers to the Kantian 
question by internalizing them within representation: to represent an object as a dog is to 
represent it as having a certain kind of history determined by an inner principle of 
change, etc. Thus, in a Kantian vein we could say: representing an object as a dog is 
representing it as temporally determinate in certain ways (standing in specific temporal 
relations to its past and future stages). If you are representing something in front of you 
as having just come into existence and as about to go out of existence then you are not 
representing it as a dog (you may be representing it as a momentary dog-stage). The 
schema of an empirical concept like <dog> might, then, plausibly be thought of as a 
time-determination.54 
But in saying all of this we will not yet have explained, or made any more plausible, 
the idea that schemata for empirical concepts are rules for representing our inner states 
                                                
53 “Semi-transcendental” because transcendental cognition sensu strictu concerns how a 
priori cognition is possible (see A56/B80). 
54 The considerations in this paragraph, and the rest of this section, are similar to the 
views of Sellars 1976 and Matherne 2015. But whereas Sellars focuses on the case of 
empirical concepts (and only makes a few remarks on schemata for pure categories), and 
Matherne is primarily concerned with images rather than schemata, I extend this broadly 
“phenomenological” interpretation to all schemata for all concepts whatsoever. See the 
following three sections for details. 
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as temporally determinate. Why should representing an object as a dog involve 
representing my very representation of the dog (a state of mine) as standing in some 
determinate range of temporal relations, rather than representing the object of that 
representation (the dog itself) as so standing? To return to a theme of the previous 
section, time is the form of inner sense; space, the form of outer sense. I take this to 
mean that temporal content is not “built into” intuitions of outer objects. Outer sense 
intuitions of objects do not represent temporal features merely in virtue of being the kind 
of representations they are (by contrast, inner sense intuitions represent temporal features 
solely in virtue of being the kind of representation they are).55 I can represent outer 
objects as having temporal features but this is not an ultimate representational fact; it 
stands in need of an explanation, a specification of its ground. We cannot simply say that 
we do represent the object (the object of an outer sense intuition) as having certain 
temporal features; we must say what is in virtue of which we are doing so. Kant’s answer 
to this question—in virtue of what are we representing an outer object as temporally 
determinate?—involves our representing our representation of that object (a state in us) 
as standing in corresponding temporal relations to other representations (other states in 
us). In particular, to represent an object as a dog is to represent one’s present intuition of 
it as standing in determinate temporal relations to other representations: actual and 
merely possible past and future intuitions of the very same object.56 To represent the 
                                                
55 See A33/B49–50 (quoted above). 
56 The idea that representing an object requires representing a relation among the 
vehicles of representation themselves (intuitions, in this case) may seem baroque, but 
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object as a dog, for instance, is to represent one’s present intuition of it as a 
representation of the very same object as, say, one’s previous intuition of it as a puppy, 
and one’s future intuition of it as an older dog. It is, more minimally, also to represent 
one’s current actual intuition as being of the same object as a non-actual but merely 
possible simultaneous intuition of it from a different spatial perspective.57 If you are 
representing your current intuition as being of an object that could not be represented 
from a different perspective, or could not have been represented in the past, or in the 
future, you are not representing that object as a dog (you may be representing it as your 
visual image of a dog).58 
Kant does not draw out these consequences of his example of the schema for <dog>. 
In fact, there are reasons he could not have, for his considered view in the third Critique 
is that representing something as a dog, an organized living thing, involves representing 
it as having a kind of internal purposive organization not accounted for by the 
transcendental theory of cognition in the first Critique.59 So there are reasons to think 
Kant may have chosen a poor example, even by his own lights. But all of the points I 
have drawn out from <dog> could also have been drawn out from one of Kant’s most 
famous examples, <cinnabar>. The difference is that cinnabar does not undergo (much) 
internal change and a sample of cinnabar does not need to have any particular past or 
                                                                                                                                           
consider that the natural alternative (simply representing temporal relations among the 
objects) is not available to Kant, given that time is the form of inner, not outer, sense.  
57  This point lies at the heart of Sellars 1976. 
58 A similar point is made by Pendlebury 1995, 790. 
59 See Critique of Judgment §65, 5:295. 
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future as long as it maintains the same inner material constitution and causal powers that 
make it cinnabar. The temporal determinacy required to represent cinnabar is thus more 
flexible (less determinate, one might say)60 than what is required to represent something 
as a dog. Just as with the case of the dog, we can transpose a purely object-oriented 
account of what is it to be cinnabar (i.e. to have a certain causal history and causal 
power) into an account of what it is to represent something as cinnabar. To represent an 
intuited object as cinnabar is to represent one’s present intuition of it as a representation 
of the same object as possible past intuitions of it, as a representation of the same object 
as possible experiences in which it passes the tests for mercury oxide, etc.  
In this section I have reconstructed Kant’s reasons for two key claims: 
Schemaemp: the schemata of empirical concepts are rules for determinately1 representing 
temporal relations among our inner states, in particular, the intuitions by which empirical 
objects are given to us. 
Subsumption Sufficiencyemp: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under the schema of 
an empirical concept (as specified above) is sufficient for subsuming1 that object under 
that concept. 
In the next section, I will reconstruct Kant’s reasons for parallel claims about 
geometrical concepts.  
Intuitions are states of ours that represent objects. In contemporary terms, we can 
distinguish intuitions as vehicles of representation (states) from the content of those 
intuitions, which for expository purposes I will take to be their objects (though I am not 
assuming that objects exhaust the content of intuition).  My discussion of empirical 
                                                
60 Determination1 is gradable (see Section 3 above). 
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schemata will arouse in some readers the suspicion that my account falls afoul of this 
distinction. For on my account, schemata are determinate1 representations of relations 
among inner states, representational vehicles. Why, in representing these relations among 
vehicles do I thereby represent something about the content of those vehicles (their 
objects)? Why do I represent the contents of these vehicles (their objects) as subsumed1 
under the corresponding concept?61 
This objection can be raised at every stage in my account of schemata, so it is worth 
responding to it here at the outset. I think this objection assumes an implausibly strong 
distinction between representing (relations among) vehicles and representing (relations 
among) contents. To take a linguistic example, names are vehicles and (let us assume, for 
the sake of simplicity) their contents are their bearers. If “Brian” is a name coined at t1 to 
refer to some perceptually demonstrated person,62 and “Alex” is coined in the same way 
at t2, in representing that “Brian” and “Alex” are co-referring terms, I am representing (if 
we now disquote the names) that Brian/Alex exists at t1 and at t2. I have represented a 
relation among contents (objects, in this case) by representing a relation among 
representational vehicles. If, instead, I had represented “Brian” (vehicle) as co-referential 
with a host of possible names coinable through perceptual demonstration from t1 to t2, 
then I would have represented Brian as existing during this period in virtue of 
                                                
61 Thanks to Colin McLear for pressing me on this. 
62 We may have to build in the assumption that a name coined through a perceptual 
demonstrative (let “Brian” refer to that guy) at a time must apply to an object that exists 
at that time. Regardless of what fixes are needed, the larger point holds: we can represent 
relations among contents by representing appropriate relations among vehicles. 
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representing a relation among an actual name (“Brian”) and merely possible names 
(vehicles).63 Likewise, if I represent my current intuition of an object as co-referential 
with possible intuitions during a period of time T, I am representing the object of my 
intuition as persisting through that period. I am subsuming1 the object of my intuition (its 
content, in this simplified story) under a concept (<persists through T>). So if the worry 
is that by representing a relation among the vehicles (intuitions) by which empirical 
objects are given to me, I am not representing anything about their objects (not adding 
additional content to my representation of the object), then the objection is based on a 
tempting fallacy. 
 
§5. Mathematical Schemata as Time-determinations64 
 
                                                
63 The role of the modalities is complicated here, and this is reflected in the Kant’s 
schemata for modal categories. However, for reasons of space, I leave my account of 
modal schemata out of this paper. 
64 Béatrice Longuenesse emphasizes the role of schemata in the understanding’s 
“affection” and thereby “determination” of inner sense (Longuenesse 1998, 246). 
However, Longuenesse never fully clarifies the meaning of “determination” here, i.e. the 
way in which schemata are transcendental time-determinations and how this explains the  
subsumption of objects under concepts. My account of schemata fills this gap in 
Longuenesse’s reading. But, unlike Longuenesse, I do not, in this paper, give an account 
of the relation of schemata to logical functions. That must await future work. 
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I noted earlier that Kant’s discussion of the schema for <dog> quasi-mathematizes this 
concept by treating it as the concept of a dog-shaped object. This suggests that Kant will 
be on stronger grounds in schematizing mathematical concepts. However, the idea that 
schemata in general are time-determinations faces the obvious objection that 
mathematical objects (e.g. triangles) are not in time,65 so it is unclear what time-
determination has to do with the possibility of subsumption in mathematics.  
In the Schematism, Kant uses two arithmetical examples and one geometrical 
example:  
[. . .] on the contrary, when I merely think of a number, which may be 5 or 100, this 
thinking is more the representation of a method for representing in an image a 
collection [Menge] appropriate to the concept (e.g. a thousand) than [it is] the image 
itself. (A140/B180) 
The scheme of the triangle can exist nowhere else than in thoughts and designates a 
rule for the synthesis of the imagination in respect of pure shapes [Gestalten] in space. 
(A141/B180) 
[. . .] the pure schema of magnitude (quantitatis), however, is number, which is a 
representation which collects together [zusammenbefaßt] the successive addition of 
unit to (homogeneous) unit [Einem zu Einem]. (A142/B182) 
This leads some commentators on the Schematism to refer back to Kant’s discussion of 
“drawing a line in thought” and “representing a certain number to myself” in the A 
                                                
65 A point of which Kant was well aware; see his letter to Schultz, November 25, 1788 
(10:556). 
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Deduction (A102; cf. B154).66 Kant’s point in the A Deduction, roughly, is that one 
cannot draw a line in thought without mentally “reproducing” the previously drawn parts 
of the line.67  
In drawing a line, or constructing a triangle in thought, one must not mentally “lose 
track” of the prior moments of one’s construction. But if we think through the 
consequences of that point, we see a structure very similar to the structure I uncovered 
earlier in empirical schemata. A schema for a mathematical concept allows us to 
subsume an object under a mathematical concept, for that is what schemata in general 
do: they make subsumption possible.68 For Kant, there is a close connection between 
mathematical subsumption and mathematical construction: to subsume an object under 
the concept <triangle> is to represent it as the result of a possible act of construction.69 
This is why the schema of <triangle> is a rule for constructing a triangle, just as the 
schema of a number n is a rule for generating a collection of n elements (see the passages 
quoted above). So if we can uncover a structure of temporal determination within the act 
                                                
66 E.g. Longuensee 1998, 249–257. 
67 “Drawing a line in thought” is Kant’s own phrase but it refers, I take it, to what he 
elsewhere refers to as construction “in pure intuition” (A713/B741). I will continue to 
use the former expression, however, since I do not have the space in this paper to discuss 
Kant’s complex doctrine of construction in pure intuition. 
68 A138/B177. 
69 I say “possible act of construction” for presumably I can see a figure in a geometrical 
proof and cognize it as a triangle without myself having to construct it, as long as I 
represent it as constructible. 
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of constructing the triangle we will have found such a structure in the act of subsuming 
an object under the concept <triangle>.  
The canonical construction of a triangle ABC has three parts: (1) using a ruler, 
construct a line segment AB of arbitrary length; (2) using a compass, construct a circle of 
arbitrary radius around one endpoint of length l (A); and (3) using a compass, construct 
another circle with radius l´ (where  |l – 𝐴𝐵| < l´< |l + 𝐴𝐵|) around the other endpoint 
(B). Let C be the point where the circles intersect; the sides of the triangle are the line 
segments AB, BC, and AC. This is represented graphically in Figure I. 
 
The straight-forward reading of A102 is that one will not have constructed a circle if, 
at stage 2, one forgets stage 1 (likewise for stage 3 and stages 2 and 1). But a stronger 
claim is warranted: one is not constructing a triangle at stage 2 if one is not aware of 
one’s construction of the circle with radius AB that it is part of a construction of a 
triangle, completing the construction of AB (stage 1) and to be completed by 
A B A B A B
C 




constructing a circle around B (stage 3); one is not constructing a triangle at stage 2 if 
one is not aware of it as completing stage 1 and to be completed by stage 3; and one is 
not constructing a triangle at stage 3 unless one is aware that this is the completion of 
stages 1 and 2, etc. We can represent this graphically as the idea that stage 1 must 
contain a representation of Figure I as a whole as well as its own place in that process; 
likewise for the other stages. I have attempted to convey this in Figure II. More 
precisely, in constructing a triangle one must be conscious at each stage of the 
construction that one’s present constructive act stands in determinate temporal relations 
to past and future acts of construction. This means that construction involves not only 
object-directed consciousness (consciousness of the object being constructed) but 
consciousness of one’s own constructive act, consciousness of one’s own 
representations. Only a being capable, at stage 2, of representing that very representation, 
as part of some larger constructive procedure, could construct a triangle. Construction, in 
other words, requires self-consciousness: consciousness of one’s representations as 
such.70 
                                                
70 Consider the following objection: a computer draws a triangle, and the representational 
content of the state of the computer that corresponds to Stage 1 is causally relevant (it is 
not erased from working memory) to the representational content of the state of the 
computer that corresponds to Stage 2, etc. But the computer lacks self-consciousness, let 
us assume. Has the computer not constructed a triangle? It has not, I would answer. 
Constructing a triangle is a priori presenting to oneself an object corresponding to the 
concept (A713/B741), which is cognition (A50/B74) and cognition, according to Kant, 
requires self-consciousness (B137). The computer may have generated an image of a 
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In the case of mathematical concepts, I take it that it is clearer than in the case of 
empirical concepts <dog> that what we are representing as temporally determinate is our 
own representations. This is clear because the object represented (the triangle) is not in 
time and because it has no being outside our construction of it. The only items here that 
could be represented as temporally determinate are the representations that make up our 
complex constructive act.71, 72  
                                                                                                                                           
triangle, but an image is not a schema (A140/B179). Schemata are products of self-
consciousness (A142/B181), and without schemata mathematical cognition and 
construction are impossible.  A non-self-consciousness machine cannot engage in 
mathematical construction. 
71 One might point to the marks on paper, or lines drawn in the sand, as the relevant 
objects. Two points about this: (i) lines drawn on paper are not geometrical lines except 
insofar as they being used as illustrations of a geometrical construction, so the point in 
the main text still holds; (ii) Kant holds that we can perform constructions without 
drawing physical figures, “through mere imagination, in pure intuition” (A713/B741). 
72 This also shows how to put to rest the concern, expressed by some commentators, that 
the Schematism may be incompatible with the General Remark to the System of 
Principles (B288–94), where Kant claims that “in order to understand the possibility of 
things in accordance with the categories, and thus to establish the objective reality of the 
latter, we do not merely need intuitions, but always outer intuitions” (B291). The 
Schematism concerns the temporal relations among intuitions we must determinately 
represent in order to subsume the objects of those intuitions under concepts; the General 
Remark concerns the spatial character of the objects of those intuitions. There is no 
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The rule for constructing a triangle is what Kant identifies as the schema of 
<triangle>. I have argued that this rule can be understood as a rule for representing the 
determinate temporal relations among various representations. This explains, I take it, 
the sense in which even mathematical schemata are time-determinations. They are 
specifically transcendental time-determinations because they explain the possibility of a 
priori cognition: a priori construction of a triangle.73 Instead of immediately turning to 
the case of arithmetical schemata, in the next section I explain how schemata of the pure 
concepts of the understanding are transcendental time-determinations. 
 
In this section I have reconstructed Kant’s reasons for two key claims: 
                                                                                                                                           
tension here. 












Schemageo: the schemata of geometrical concepts are rules for determinately1 
representing temporal relations among our inner states, in particular, the states involved 
in constructing a corresponding object. 
Subsumption Sufficiencygeo: subsuming1 an object under the schema of a geometrical 
concept (as specified above) is sufficient for subsuming1 that object under the concept. 
In the next section, I will reconstruct Kant’s reasons for parallel claims about the 
categories. 
 
§6. Pure Schemata as Time-determinations 
 
I have argued that schemata in general are time-determinations, rules for (self)-
consciously representing one’s representations (inner states) as standing in determinate 
temporal relations. In this section I want to apply this analysis to the primary case of 
schemata, the schemata of pure concepts of the understanding (categories). Kant’s 
discussion of the schemata of individual categories at A142–5/B182–4 has a recursive 
structure, insofar as later sets of categories are schematized in terms of previous sets. 
Consequently, I will discuss the schemata of the categories in the order in which they 
appear in the Table of Categories itself–quality, quantity, and relation. For reasons of 
space, I forego discussion of the schemata of modal categories.74  
                                                
74 The Table of Categories derives, of course, from the Table of Logical Functions of 
Understanding in Judging (A76–80/B102–106). Consequently, we should expect a 
relation between schemata and logical functions of judging, which is directly confirmed 




In my discussion of mathematical schemata earlier, I focused on geometrical 
schemata to the exclusion of Kant’s other main mathematical example, arithmetical 
schemata for concepts of numbers. I did so because numerical schemata arise in the 
course of Kant providing schemata for the categories of quantity and thus deserve a 
separate treatment:75  
[. . .] the pure schema of magnitude (quantitatis), however, is number, which is a 
representation that collects together [zusammenbefaßt] the successive addition of unit 
to (homogeneous) unit [Einem zu Einem].  Number is thus nothing other than the 
unity of the manifold of a homogenous intuition in general [überhaupt], through 
                                                                                                                                           
determined in respect of a logical function” (18:392; cf. A79/B104–5, A94/B128). The 
most complete attempt to relate the schemata systematically to logical functions of 
judging is Longuenesse 1998, ch.9–11. Longuenesse does not discuss the modal 
schemata, however. I tackle modal schemata in work currently in preparation. 
75 Immediately before this passage, Kant writes “the pure image of all magnitudes 
(quantorum) for outer sense is space; that of all objects of the senses in general is time” 
(A142/B182). I am not giving an account of images, so I will not attempt to explain that 
puzzling claim here. The account of images in Matherne 2015 is in line with my 
interpretation of schemata, but does not discuss the “pure images” of space and time 
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which I generate [erzeuge] time itself in the apprehension of the intuition. 
(A142/B182)76 
It is notable that Kant does not give individual schemata for each of the categories of 
quantity–<unity>, <plurality>, <totality>–but instead gives a single schema for quantity 
in general, which he calls “number” (Zahl).77 I take this to mean that each of the 
categories of quantity is to be schematized, and thus given conditions of application to 
sensible objects, in virtue of its role within a unified act of numbering or counting. The 
structural moments of such an act of counting are relatively easy to articulate. To assign 
a whole number n to a sensible object, and thus to think of it as an object with a 
quantitas, a determinate limited magnitude, is to identify a unit of numbering. This can 
                                                
76 Kant’s terminology here should be remarked. He schematizes the concept “magnitude” 
(Größe) and identifies it with “quantitas.” A magnitude is what Kant elsewhere calls a 
“quantum,” which he defines as follows: “Quantum is one thing, in which there is 
quantity [Quantum: est unum, in quo est quantitas]” (28: 21). So a quantum is an 
intuitively given object in which there is quantitas, i.e. in which many other objects are 
also posited (“quantitas: determination entis, quoties sit positum—Ibid; cf. A163/B204). 
When the quantum has determinately many parts, when the answer “how many?” has a 
determinate answer (given a specification of a unit-part), then it can be numbered and the 
schema given in the body of the paper applies. Infinite quantities (quanta with infinite 
quantitas), like space and time, cannot be numbered; their quantitas exceeds any 
number, so the schematization I supply below does not apply. See Longuenesse 1998, 
264–271, and Sutherland 2004, 427–435, for a discussion of quantum and quantitas. 
77 Longuenesse 1998, 253–4, also makes this point. 
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be as simple as picking some part of the object as the unit to be counted or as (relatively) 
complex as picking some standard length as the unit. 78 I will focus on the simple case of 
numbering the parts of a thing. First we identify some part of the object as the unit of 
counting. For instance, given a book we can count either chapters or pages. After that, 
we successively distinguish and enumerate the parts of the object that are conceptually 
homogenous with the chosen unit. For instance, having chosen to count the pages in the 
CPR, we successively distinguish each of the pages of the book. The process ceases 
when we have counted every part of the object, when no parts remain that were not 
distinguished and enumerated at previous stages. The structural moments of a whole 
number n as the quantity of an object, considered as a collection of parts, relative to a 
choice of unit, is given in Figure III. 
                                                
78 The reason the second case is more complex is it requires representing the unit as itself 
something that is quantitatively determinate, so it depends upon a prior act of 
quantitative determination. For ease of exposition, in the main text I focus on the case of 
simply counting the parts of an object. 
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As with the geometrical example from section 4 the straightforward way of reading 
Kant’s discussion of reproduction in the A Deduction (A102) is that at each stage of this 
process one must not “forget” the previous stages. In line with my discussion of the 
geometrical example, though, I think we can say something stronger: in order for any of 
the stages distinguished in Figure III to be parts of a mental act of counting an object, 
one must represent the entire process represented in Figure III as well as the relation 
between one’s current stage and the rest of the process. One must represent one’s current 
representation as the enumeration of the kth part, completing the enumeration of the 1 to 
(k-1)th and to be completed by the (k+1) to nth parts. In so representing the relation of 
one’s current representation to previous and past representations, one is representing 
one’s representation as standing in determinate temporal relations. This is the 
arithmetical version of a point we saw in geometric construction in the previous section. 
Represented graphically, it is the requirement that at each stage distinguished in Figure 
Stage 1 Stage k Stage n 
Figure III 
t 
. . . . . . . . . . 
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III, the whole of Figure III must be represented as well as one’s current position within 
that process. Figure IV is an attempt to illustrate this point. 
 
 
Earlier I said that each of the categories of quantity is to be schematized by its role in 
this unified act of quantitatively determining a magnitude. In particular, when we specify 
some part as the unit of counting we subsume that object under the category <unity>; at 
each stage in the enumeration we subsume the relevant sub-collection enumerated at that 
stage under <plurality>; and when we complete the process we subsume the whole 
collection under <totality>, a single object composed of a plurality with a determinate 
magnitude with respect to the unit (in this case, n).79  Subsuming objects under these 
                                                
79 In the Prolegomena (4:303) Kant identifies unity, plurality, and totality, with, 
respectively, measure (Maß), magnitude (Größe), and the whole (das Ganze). These 
correspond to the structural moments of the act of enumeration described in the main 
Stage 1 Stage k Stage n 
Figure IV 
t 
. . . . . . . . . . 
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categories just is representing the intuitions in which they are given as components of 
this complex self-conscious act of time-determination.80 
In this section I have reconstructed Kant’s reasons for two key claims: 
Schemaquant: the schema of the categories of quantity is a rule for determinately1 
representing temporal relations among our inner states, in particular, the states involved 
in representing a sensibly given object as a determinate magnitude. 
Because there is only one schema for three different categories of quality, the individual 
categories are schematized by their role in the complete schema specified above. 
Consequently, subsuming an object under the relevant moment or aspect of the complete 
schema is subsuming it under the corresponding category: 
                                                                                                                                           
text. To represent an object as a unity is to represent it as a measure of enumeration in 
some larger collection. To represent an object as a plurality is to represent it as a 
magnitude, as something with quantitas with respect to a unit/measure. But it is not yet 
to represent it as a totality, for not all of the parts have been enumerated. Representing an 
object as a totality is representing it as the whole, the place where enumeration ends. If 
you are enumerating an infinite magnitude (space, time) at every step you are 
representing it as a plurality without having enumerated all of its parts, i.e. you are not 
yet representing it as a totality/whole. Representing space and time as totalities requires 
starting with the whole and then proceeding to the parts/limitations; that involves a 
different schema. But I am limiting myself to number as the schema of determinate, 
finite quantitas (see above). 
80 This is my detailed specification of what Longuenesse 1998 refers to as the 
“understanding [affecting] inner sense’” (259) in the case of quantity. 
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Subsumption Sufficiencyquant: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under the schema of 
quantity (as specified above) is sufficient for subsuming1 that object under quantity as 
such (representing it as having a quantity); subsuming an object under a specific moment 
of that schema is sufficient for subsuming1 it under the corresponding category. 
In the next section, I will reconstruct Kant’s reasons for holding parallel principles about 
quality. 
 
 (ii) Quality 
Kant’s initial characterization of the first two categories of quality, <reality> and 
<negation>, is deceptively simple: 
Reality, in the pure concept of the understanding, is that which, in general, 
corresponds [korrespondiert] to a sensation. Thus, [it is] that whose concept contains 
in itself a being in time, while negation is that whose concept represents a non-being 
(in time). The opposition of the two occurs, consequently, in the distinction of one and 
the same time, as either a filled or an empty time. (A143/B183) 
The distinction Kant here draws between filled and empty time relies on the distinction 
between form and matter. Time is the form of inner sense (thus, the form of our inner 
states as intuited by us) but the matter that time “en-forms” is the very inner states 
(representations) we intuit in temporal order. The distinction between <reality> and 
<negation> is the difference between matter en-formed by time (“filled” time) and pure 
form without en-formed matter (“empty” time). The concept of <reality> is to be applied 
to whatever in objects “corresponds to” this representational matter in us, which Kant 
identifies with “thing-hood” (Sachheit) and which he will later be in a position to 
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identify as causal powers in spatiotemporal objects, once he has introduced the 
categories of relation.81  
The difference between the positive presence of some sensory matter in us and its 
absence (as well as the presence and absence of the corresponding reality in the object) is 
continuously gradable, not discrete:  
Now every sensation has a degree or magnitude, by which it can more or less fill the 
same time, i.e. inner sense in respect of the same representation of an object, until it 
ceases in nothing (=0 =negatio). Consequently there is a relation and connection 
between, or, better, a transition from, reality to negation, which makes every reality 
representable as a quantum [. . .] (A143/B183) 
                                                
81 “If one regards this reality as cause (whether of the sensation or of another reality in 
appearance, e.g., an alteration), then one calls the degree of reality as cause a ‘moment,’ 
[. . .] But I touch on this here only in passing, for at present I am not yet dealing with 
causality” (A168–9/B210). I take this to mean that we cannot represent the intensive 
degree of reality in our sensation as caused by a corresponding intensive degree of reality 
in the affecting object until we have the machinery of the Analogies in place. In this 
respect, Kant’s original statement of the principle of the Anticipations (A166: “in all 
appearances sensation and the real, to which it corresponds in the object, have an 
intensive magnitude, i.e. a degree”) is more precise than its replacement in the B Edition 
(B207: “in all appearances the real, which is an object of sensation, has an intensive 
magnitude, i.e. a degree”). In the A edition Kant has separated the claim that sensation 
has intensive magnitude from the further claim that the corresponding object does; in the 
B edition only the claim about the object is retained. 
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Thus, even if the complete absence of sensory matter is representable, we can still think 
of the total absence of reality in general as the limit of a process of continuous decrease 
in reality. What is more, we can think of the absence of a specific reality (corresponding 
to a specific kind of sensory matter, e.g. redness) as an achieved limit.82 
Kant only explicitly gives the schema for quality only in the rest of the paragraph: “[. . 
.] the schema of a reality, as the quantity of something insofar as it fills time, is precisely 
this continuous and uniform generation [Erzeugung] of [that reality] in time, as one 
decreases the sensation over time, which has a determinate degree, until its complete 
disappearance, or one gradually increases from zero to the magnitude of the sensation” 
(A143/B183). Just as with the categories of quality, Kant does not give a different 
schema for each category of quality (<reality>, <negation>, <limitation>) but gives a 
single schema, which I take to be the schema for the whole moment of quality. Again, as 
with quantity, Kant specifies the schema as a single complex mental act (“this 
continuous and uniform generation“). I take it that, in parallel with quantity, the 
individual categories of quality are schematized insofar as they are identified with 
structural moments of that complex mental act, so I will proceed to analyze that complex 
mental act and isolate the relevant moments. 
The complex mental act is the representation of the gradual diminution of a sensory 
matter of a particular kind to the limit case of total absence of that kind of sensory 
                                                
82 I talk about specific realities because I take Kant to be arguing, not only that sensation 
in general has a degree (one perception can be more intense than other), but that specific 
kinds of sensation do as well (one perception can be more intense in respect of one 
quality than another, and less intense in respect of another).  
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matter. Unlike the case of quantity, this mental act does not have discretely separable 
parts; there are indefinitely many “degrees” that separate the presence of a given sensory 
matter from its total absence (=0). To represent it as having a determinate magnitude we 
must represent it as generable (possibly generated) from smaller magnitudes: we must 
represent the sensory matter in us as the limit of some possible continuous process of 
increasing magnitude, and as the beginning of some possible process of indefinite 
continuous increase (assuming no sensory reality has an absolute maximum).83, 84 This 
means that in order to represent our present sensory matter (<reality>) we must self-
consciously represent it as standing in various relations to possible past and future 
representations: it is the limit of some possible past process of continuous increase, the 
beginning of some possible future process of continuous increase (<limitation>), and the 
beginning of some possible future process of continuous diminishment whose limit is its 
absence (<negation>).85  
                                                
83 We ourselves do not actively generate the magnitude of sensation, for sensation is the 
passive result of affection; see Longuenesse 1998, 300. 
84 The temporal direction is a heuristic device; we can just as well represent our present 
sensory matter as the product of a decrease, and the beginning of a further process of 
decrease. 
85 To put this in familiar Humean terms, to represent a given shade of blue as a 
determinate gradable hue we do not need to actually represent the “missing shade” of 
blue (and then generate the given shade out of it); we must be able to represent that 
missing shade (and represent the given shade as generated out of it). 
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So, again we have the recursive structure we have seen already in the case of 
empirical, mathematical, and quantitative schemata: representing the object of an 
intuition as falling under a category (subsuming the object under the category) is self-
consciously representing that representation as standing in determinate temporal relations 
to possible past, present, and future representations. In each case, we have the structure 
of some temporally complex mental act (experiencing an empirical object over time, 
constructing a geometrical figure, counting), such that every stage in that act must self-
consciously be represented as a stage in an actual or possible such act in order to 
constitute a stage in an act of that type.86 
In this section I have given an account of Kant’s reasons for two key claims: 
Schemaqual: the schema of the categories of quality is a rule for determinately1 
representing temporal relations among our inner states, in particular, the states involved 
in representing sensory matter as continuously increasable or decreasable. 
Because there is only one schema for three different categories of quality, the individual 
categories are schematized by their role in the complete schema specified above. 
Consequently, subsuming an object under the relevant moment or aspect of the complete 
schema is subsuming it under the corresponding category: 
Subsumption Sufficiencyqual: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under the schema of 
quality (as specified above) is sufficient for subsuming1 that object under quality as such 
(representing it having a quality); subsuming an object under a specific moment of that 
schema is sufficient for subsuming1 it under the corresponding category. 
                                                
86 This is my more detailed specification of what Longuenesse 1998 refers to as 




Matters are significantly more complicated with the schemata of the categories of 
relation, for here (for the first time) Kant gives a separate schema for each category. For 
reasons of space, I will discus only <substance>,87 which Kant schematizes as follows: 
“the schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time, i.e. the representation of it 
as a substratum of empirical time-determination in general, which remains while 
everything else changes [wechselt]” (A144/B183). 
Kant’s discussion here is complicated by the fact that he is anticipating a significant 
amount of material from the Analogies (especially the first Analogy), some of which 
appears as a parenthetical remark after the quoted sentence. Representing outer objects as 
“outer” (not transcendentally outer but “empirically” outer; cf. A373) means representing 
them not as states of mine but as objects in space that other subjects can access through 
their states. Kant’s argument in the Analogies, which is partly anticipated here, is that we 
do this by representing those objects as having a temporal order in principle different 
from the temporal order of the inner states by which those objects are given to us.88 We, 
                                                
87 The schema of <cause-effect> cannot be satisfactorily discussed here, for the relation 
of time and modality in that case is especially complicated. I discuss this issue further in 
work currently in preparation. 
88 See B219. The Analogies have spawned a vast literature, to which I cannot hope to do 
justice here. Two highlights are Guyer 1987, 207–278, and Watkins 2005, 185–229. 
Whereas Guyer adopts an “epistemic” reading of the Analogies, on which they uncover 
the conditions of our knowledge of objective time (1987, 258–9), Watkins opts for a 
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in effect, externalize time by “projecting” it onto outer objects. Time has three structural 
aspects or “moments”: unity (there is only one time; all states in time are temporally 
related), succession (states are ordered by an irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive relation 
of priority) and simultaneity (some states are neither before nor after one another).89 The 
unity of time, combined with its successive and simultaneous structure, entail that any 
two states in time are either simultaneous or successive. Kant’s argument in the 1st 
Analogy is that in order to represent “outer time” (the time of the states of outer objects) 
as unitary we must represent an absolutely persisting subject, substance, of which the 
states changing in time are mere accidents.90  
Kant’s task in the Schematism is not to make that argument but to explain what it is in 
virtue of which we are able to so much as think of an outer object as substance or as an 
accidental modification of substance (subsumption1) and how it is possible for such 
                                                                                                                                           
“metaphysical” reading, on which they uncover the grounds of objective temporal 
relations obtaining in the first place (2005, 200–1), which itself make our knowledge of 
objective temporal relations possible. However, I opt for what I call a “semantic” 
reading: the Analogies uncover the conditions of the possibility of so much as 
determinately representing (determining1) temporal relations among outer objects. (Some 
remarks in Friedman 1992, 46–7, suggest a similar view.) Given Kant’s transcendental 
idealism, objective time determination1 makes possible objective time determination2, 
which makes possible objective time determination4 (this is Watkins’s point). But I do 




objects to be substances and accidental modifications (subsumption2). We can think of 
the difference between these tasks as the difference between explaining how it is possible 
to subsume (in both senses) outer objects under <substance> (Schematism) and arguing 
that it is necessary to do so (1st Analogy).91  
The schema of <substance> relies on the schema of the categories of quality: “the 
schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time” (A144/B183). In order to 
represent spatial objects as substances we must represent them as having realities, the 
features in them that correspond to the sensory matter of our representations. This 
requires the whole complex machinery explored in the previous sub-section. We further 
represent these objects as substances when we present their reality as persisting at all 
times, as the ultimate “substratum” in virtue of which states of outer objects are 
temporally determinate with respect to one another. “Substances,” Kant writes near the 
end of the 1st Analogy, “are the substrate of all time-determination” (A188/B231).92  
I want to make two comments on this. First, in describing substance as the 
“substratum” of time-determination Kant does not mean “substrate” in the traditional 
sense in which it is synonymous with substance (that would result in the tautology that 
                                                
91 Likewise, the Transcendental Deduction proves the necessity of subsuming (in both 
senses) sensible objects under categories, while the Schematism explains the possibility 
of doing so (in both senses). Similar points are made by Pendlebury 1995, 779; 
Dahlstrom 1984, 41; and Symington 2011, 289. 
92 See A183/B226, A185/B229. 
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substances are substances)93 but in the broader sense of “that which makes possible,” a 
sense manifestly present in his description of time (which, as pure sensible form, lacks 
reality, hence substantiality) as itself a “substratum” (B224).  Thinking of spatial objects 
as accidental modifications of absolutely permanent substance is representing this 
substance as the “substratum” of temporal determination because that substance is the 
background against which temporal determination is representable. Secondly, 
“determination” here once again has the semantic sense of determination1: substance is 
the “substratum” of temporal determination in the sense that it is what make it possible to 
determinately1 represent states of outer objects as temporally related to one another.94 
Kant is not yet concerned with the conditions under which we can know (determine4) the 
temporal states of objects, nor the conditions under which they can be determined3 (the 
necessary effect of a cause)—for that requires the categories of <cause-effect> and 
<reciprocal action> (which come next in Kant’s discussion)—nor is he yet concerned (in 
                                                
93 The non-tautologous claim, which Kant does make in the Schematism, and for which 
he argues in the Analogies, is that the persistent (substance) is the “substratum” in which 
that which changes (wechselt) (accidents) inhere. 
94  “All appearances are in time, in which, as substratum (as persistent form of inner 
intuition), both simultaneity as well as succession can alone be represented. The time, 
therefore, in which all change of appearances is to be thought, lasts and does not change; 
since it is that in which succession or simultaneity can be represented only as 
determinations of it” (B224–5). See also A186/B229 (“everything would disappear that 
alone can represent the unity of time”) and A188/B231 (“it is this very thing that persists 
that makes possible the representation of the transition from one state into another”). 
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the Schematism) with the conditions under which states in space acquire determinate2 
temporal relations, though all of these notions of determination will play a role in Kant’s 
complete story (especially the second and the third Analogy). He is concerned, in the 
schema of <substance>, with the conditions under which we can subsume1 outer objects 
under determinate concepts of their temporal relations, i.e. the conditions under which it 
is possible to determinately represent (determine1) temporal relations in space.  
Yet again, in the schema of <substance>, we have the structure of reflexive self-
conscious temporality that we have seen in the other cases. To represent an object as a 
substance it to represent it as possessing a reality (corresponding to the sensory matter in 
my representations) that is present at all times. This means that it is the very same 
substance that has been encountered in the past and will be re-encountered in the future. 
Obviously, to represent it as present at all times I do not need to have ever encountered it 
before or to ever encounter it again; I need only represent it as possibly encountered in 
the past and possibly encountered in the future. I also need to represent it as possibly 
encountered in the present, and not merely for the trivial reason that in representing it as 
actually encountered now I trivially represent it as possibly encountered now; it is 
because I must represent it as a persisting object in space that could have been 
represented by me in different ways now, e.g. that could have been intuited from a 
different spatial vantage point. In representing it as possibly encountered in the past and 
possibly to be re-encountered in the future I am, for reasons parallel to those given in 
Section 4, representing my current representation of it as related to possible and actual 
past and future representations. In other words, I am representing it as determinately 
temporally related to possible past and future representations. It is something that was 
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not encountered in the past but could have been, that will be encountered in the future 
under certain conditions, etc. Just as we “transposed into representation” the Aristotelian 
considerations about the possible life of a dog, we can transpose purely object-oriented 
considerations about the possible spatiotemporal trajectory of a substance into 
considerations about possible and actual past and future representations that would be 
representations of the same substance. 
Just as in the other cases, we have a relatively simple account of the mental act of 
representing an object under <substance> (thinking of it as persisting at all times) and 
then we have the more complex structure in which that structure is, so to speak, 
embedded in every one of its own stages. More precisely, for any stage in the cognition 
of a substance to be a state in such a cognitive act, one must be self-consciously 
representing that stage as a determinate stage in a sequence of possible and actual past, 
simultaneous, and future experiences of the same object.95 If one’s representation of the 
object has this complicated, recursive temporal structure, then one has succeeded in 
subsuming the object under the category <substance>. 
In this section I have given an account of Kant’s reasons for two key claims: 
Schemasub: the schema of <substance> is a rule for determinately1 representing the 
temporal relations among our inner states, in particular, the states by which a temporally 
persistent object is given to us. 
                                                
95 This is my detailed specification of what Longuenesse 1998 refers to as the 
“understanding affecting inner sense’” (332) in the case of <substance>. 
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Subsumption Sufficiencysub: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under the schema of 
<substance> (as specified above) is sufficient for subsuming1 the object under that 
concept. 
In concluding Part One, I hope to have established, for each of the kinds of concepts 
considered here and their associated schemata: 
Schema: the schema of a concept is a rule for determinately1 representing the temporal 
relations among our inner states, in particular, inner states by which an object is given to 
us. 
Subsumption Sufficiency: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under the schema of a 
concept is sufficient to subsume1 it under that concept. 
My argument for this principle has been by cases. In my defense, this is precisely how 
Kant proceeds in the Schematism: he provides schemata for the categories, case by case. 
So the argument for Subsumption Sufficiency in its full generality will be incomplete 
until we have explained how each of the remaining categories (<cause-effect>, 
<reciprocal action>, and the modal categories) are transcendental time-determinations 
for which Subsumption Sufficiency holds. For reasons of space I cannot do that here, but 






The ultimate aim of the Schematism, I have argued, is to explain the possibility of the 
subsumption2 of objects under categories (to answer Q2 from the Introduction). 
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Combined with Subsumption Sufficiency, which I have argued for at length, 
Subsumption Link has the effect of reducing this problem to the problem of subsuming2 
objects under schemata. In this section and the next I will reconstruct Kant’s explanation 
of why subsumption2 of objects under schemata is possible, the Real Possibility premise 
from the Introduction. This completes Kant’s explanation of why subsumption2 of 
objects under categories is possible, his answer to Q2.  
Kant begins the Schematism with a humble example meant to illustrate the 
“homogeneity” between objects and the concepts under which they are subsumed: 
In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representation of the former must 
be homogenous [gleichartig] with the representation of the latter, i.e. the concept must 
contain that which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed, for that is what 
the expression “an object is contained under a concept” means [bedeutet]. Thus the 
empirical concept of a plate is homogenous with the pure geometrical [concept] of a 
circle, in that the roundness that is thought in the former can be intuited in the latter.96 
(A137/B176) 
Since we are concerned in this section with, finally, explaining subsumption2 let us 
assume that is what Kant has in mind by “subsumption” in this passage.97  
                                                
96 “So hat der empirische Begriff eines Tellers mit dem reinen geometrischen eines 
Zirkels Gleichartigkeit, indem die Rundung, die in dem ersteren gedacht wird, sich im 
letzteren anschauen läßt.“ 
97 In fact, the difference between subsumption1 and subsumption2 is already implicitly 
contained in the passage itself. When Kant writes “that is what the expression ‘an object 
is contained under a concept’ means [Au’s emphasis]” he is talking about subsumption1: 
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This passage bears the mark of having been hastily written. First of all, the syntax in 
the second sentence is confused. To what does “the latter” (letzteren) refer? 
Grammatically, the natural answer is “the pure geometric [concept] of a circle,” but this 
makes little sense. Concepts cannot be intuited; what can be intuited are the objects that 
fall under concepts, so we might read “the latter” (letzteren) as referring to “a circle.”98 
But, philosophically, this makes little sense: Kant would then be explaining the 
subsumption of a purely geometric circle (the object of the pure geometrical concept of a 
circle) under the empirical concept of a plate. More plausible is Hans Vaihinger’s 
suggestion to reverse “the former” and “the latter”: “in that the roundness, that is thought 
in the latter can be intuited in the former.”99 But even that is unsatisfactory, for an 
                                                                                                                                           
when I say that an object is contained under a concept, I am subsuming1 it under that 
concept (that is what the expression means), but I may be doing so incorrectly (it may 
not be subsumed2 or even subsumable2 under that concept). The meaning of the sentence 
“an object is contained under a concept” does not guarantee that the sentence is true (that 
the object is contained/subsumed2 under that concept). So here, at the very beginning of 
the Schematism, we have an implicit difference between thinking that an object falls 
under a concept (subsumption1) and the fact that object does fall under that concept 
(subsumption2). 
98 This is even more awkward in German, because “a circle” (eines Zirkels) is in the 
genitive. But an awkward reading is preferable to an incoherent one, on which Kant is 
saying that the concept of a circle can be intuited. 
99 “indem die Runding, die in dem letzteren gedacht wird, sich im ersteren anschauen 
läßt” (Vaihinger 1900, 458). Kemp Smith follows Vaihinger’s reading in his translation 
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empirical concept like  <plate> can no more be intuited than a pure geometrical concept! 
But the problems with this passage do not stop there. In the context of the first 
sentence, it is clear that Kant is here interested in the homogeneity of (representations of) 
objects and the concepts under which they are to be subsumed2. But, taken at 
grammatical face value, and even given Vaihinger’s proposed reading, Kant explicates 
his example, in the second sentence, in terms of the homogeneity of two concepts: the 
empirical concept <plate> and the pure geometric concept <circle>. I think the best way 
to make Kant’s example make sense, both within his own theory and specifically as an 
example of object subsumption2, is to read him as talking about the homogeneity 
between the intuition of a round object, an object subsumed2 under the empirical concept 
<plate>, and the pure geometric concept <circle>. So the second sentence might be 
rendered more perspicuously (albeit with some violence to the text) as follows: “thus the 
empirical representation [rather than concept] of a plate has homogeneity with the pure 
geometrical [concept] of a circle, in that the roundness that is thought in the latter [the 
concept <circle>] can be intuited in the former [the empirical representation].”  The 
object is homogeneous, specifically, with one mark of <round>, one of the marks of 
<plate> (this is how I read Kant’s reference to the “roundness that is thought” in the 
empirical concept of a plate).  
This example relies on there being something that can be intuited in the object (its 
roundness) that is also thought in a concept (<round>). The possibility of the 
                                                                                                                                           
(Kant 1909, 180); Timmerman notes Vaihinger’s reading without endorsing it (Kant 
1998b, 239); the issue goes unremarked by Adickes (Kant 1889, 173) and Guyer & 
Wood (Kant 1998a, 271). 
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subsumption2 of the object (the plate) under the concept (<round>) consists in the 
possibility of that very same feature being intuitable in the object and represented by the 
concept. Or, to put the point at a slightly higher level of generality, there are intuitable 
features of objects that are also represented by concepts. It is notable that Kant takes this 
kind of homogeneity to stand in need of no further explanation; we do not need an 
explanation of the subsumption2 of a round object under <round>. Instead, he uses it to 
motivate the search for a similar kind of homogeneity, a homogeneity between objects 
and categories, which ultimately is revealed to be a homogeneity between objects and 
schemata. 
The reason that Kant can take such homogeneity (between roundness in the intuited 
object and <round>) to be unproblematic is that the feature in question (roundness) is a 
feature of objects purely qua intuited.100 Roundness, after all, is a spatial feature, that is 
to say, a specification of the form of outer objects in general (space). I will call such 
features of objects intuitive features. 101 A feature F is an intuitive feature of outer (inner) 
                                                
100 Hence I am not bothered by the fact that Kant equates the subsumption of an object 
under a concept with the homogeneity of the representation of the former with the latter 
(see A137/B176 quoted above). The relevant representation of an object is an intuition, 
and I am talking about features of objects solely qua intuited. So in this case, there is an 
especially close connection between the object and our representation of it. 
101 What I call “intuitive features” corresponds to what Smit 2000 calls “intuitive marks”. 
Smit’s idea is that “marks” (partial grounds of cognition) can be either intuitively or 
discursive. Intuitive marks are singular features of objects, now referred to as tropes. 
Discursive marks are general representations of what is common to those intuitive marks. 
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objects just in case F is a determinate of some determinable D, where outer (inner) 
objects have D solely in virtue of being objects of outer (inner) intuition.102 For instance, 
roundness is an intuitive feature of outer objects because it is a determinate of shaped, 
and shaped is a determinable that objects have solely in virtue of being objects of outer 
intuition. Likewise, occurring before is an intuitive relational feature of inner objects, 
because it is a determinable of being successive, and being successive is a determinable 
that objects have in solely in virtue of being objects of inner intuition.103 So the real 
possibility of an intuitable object with an intuitive feature being subsumed2 under the 
concept of such a feature is not problematic. This is why Kant writes, a few lines later: 
“In all other sciences, where the concepts, through which the object in general is thought, 
                                                                                                                                           
For instance, the roundness of the plate is an intuitive mark, while <round> is a 
discursive mark. Kant spells this out in a Reflexion: “A mark is a partial representation 
(which), as such (is a ground of cognition). It is either intuitive (a synthetic part): a part 
of intuition, or discursive: a part of a concept, which is an analytic ground of cognition” 
(Refl. 2286, 16:299–300; see Smit 2000, 254–9). Whereas Smit characterizes intuitive 
marks as marks “found” in space and time, I impose a more informative criterion: they 
must be determinates of a determinable grounded in the very nature of the form of the 
relevant faculty (outer sense or inner sense). 
102 I am not assuming that determinates are fully determinate, but merely that they are 
more determinate that determinables. E.g. round is more determinate than shaped, but it 
is not as fully determinate as circular. 
103 Chipman 1971 is after something similar with his talk of “elementary sensory 
components” (39). 
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are not so different and heterogenous [heterogen] from those which represent the object 
in concreto, as it is given, it is unnecessary to offer a special discussion of the application 
of the former to the latter” (A138/B177). Kant is making the simplifying assumption that 
in sciences other than metaphysics, concepts are concepts of intuitive features, and thus 
there is no deep problem in explaining how the subsumption2 of objects under such 
concepts is possible. His considered view about “other sciences” is, of course, 
significantly more complex than this.104  
I have constructed some machinery for explaining the subsumption1 of objects under 
categories but we can apply this machinery to give an easy explanation of the 
subsumption2 of objects under empirical concepts. In §4 I specified the schemata of 
empirical concepts. These will involve both intuitive features of objects and complex 
temporal relations among the intuitions by which objects are given to us. But these 
temporal relations are themselves intuitive features: they are determinate specifications 
                                                
104 Kant’s considered view is that all sciences, in the strict sense, contain an a priori part, 
in which a priori concepts (the categories) are applied to sensible objects. The paradigm 
example of this is the pure part of natural science, given in the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science. The subsumption2 of objects under the a priori concepts 
involved in pure natural science does, of course, stand in need of explanation; this is why 
the CPR explains not only the possibility of metaphysics, but also of natural science 
(B17, A171-2/B213). However, even on Kant’s considered view, a version of his 
A138/B177 point holds: the subsumption2 that primarily stands in need of explanation in 
other sciences is the subsumption2 he is about to explain, the subsumption2 of objects 
under categories. 
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of the determinable form of inner states in general (time).  
But my articulation of the schema of the empirical concept <dog> (Kant’s example) 
made use of a relation among intuitions that, some readers will object, is not an intuitive 
feature: the relation of two intuitions co-referring, i.e. being intuitions of one and the 
same object. Is co-reference an intuitive feature? Solely in virtue of being intuitions 
(whether of outer or inner sense), intuitions have objects. As such, intuitions can have the 
same or different objects. This means that the very form of intuition, regardless of 
whether it is outer or inner, grounds a determinable relational feature having the same or 
different objects, of which one determinate is having the same object. By the definition 
of intuitive feature, it follows that having the same object is an intuitive relational feature 
of intuitions. Some readers will remain skeptical about whether having the same object is 
an intuitive relational feature of intuitions; I address that skepticism in the next section. 
The schemata of empirical concepts represent intuitive features of the representations 
by which empirical objects are given to us: intuitive temporal relations and relations of 
co-reference. So there is no difficulty in explaining how subsuming2 sensible objects 
under these schemata is possible; sensible objects can stand in these relations solely in 
virtue of being objects of intuition.105 Given Subsumption Sufficiencyemp (see §4) and 
Subsumption Link, it follows that subsuming2 objects under those empirical concepts is 
                                                
105 Readers might object: schemata represent intuitive relational features of 
representations, not of objects (e.g. co-reference is a relation of intuitins, not of their 
objects). Why is subsuming (in either sense) the representations under the schemata 
sufficient to subsume the objects? For the answer to this question see my discussion on 
p. 35–36. 
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really possible.  
Geometric schemata (see §5) represent spatial features of their objects as well as 
temporal relations among the stages of the procedure by which the object is constructed. 
But the temporal relations they represent (stage 1 is before stage 2, which is before stage 
3; see Figure II) are intuitive features: determinate specifications of determinable 
features objects have solely in virtue of being intuited. The very form of time determines 
that inner states stand in an asymmetric relation of succession (A31/B47), so in 
representing the determinate temporal relations among the parts of a constructive 
procedure, a geometric schema is not representing anything more than intuitive relational 
features.106 Given Subsumption Sufficiency (see §6) and Subsumption Linkgeo, it follows 
                                                
106 It might seem that, on my account, schemata represent more than merely temporal 
relations, unproblematically allowed for by the very form of time (succession) for I 
spoke of stages of a constructive procedure as “completing one another” and “to be 
completed by another.” This kind of language might suggest that schemata represent 
something like teleological relations among our representations, and teleological 
relations are definitely not what I have called “intuitive features.” But the “completion” 
language was not meant to connote teleology, but, instead, self-referentiality: to be 
constructing a triangle at stage 2, one must self-consciously represent one’s current 
representation as part of a larger constructive procedure, composed of a prior stage 1, 
and a later stage 2. This does not require that, in any problematic sense, stage 1 is “for 
the sake of” stage 2, or stage 2 “for the sake of” stage 3, but only that stage 1 is only 
stage 1 of a construction if it is followed by stage 2, etc. Since the relations thus 
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that subsuming2 objects under these empirical concepts is really possible.  
What is problematic, what the entire machinery of schemata is designed to explain, is 
the real possibility of a sensible object being subsumed2 under a concept that is not 
merely a concept of some feature that is a specification of the form of intuitiable objects 
in general. In the next section I complete that explanation. 
 
§8. Real Possibility 
 
Immediately after the plate example, Kant writes: 
Now pure concepts of the understanding, however, in comparison with empirical 
(indeed in general sensible) intuitions, are entirely unhomogenous [ungleichartig] and 
can never be encountered in any intuition. (A137/B176) 
I take this to mean that categories are not concepts of intuitive features, because they are 
not concepts of features that are specifications of the form of intuitable objects as such 
(unlike <round> or <occurs before>). Kant goes on: 
Now it is clear that there must be a third [thing], which is homogenous with the 
category, on the one hand, and with the appearance, on the other, and which makes 
possible the application of the former to the latter. This mediating representation must 
be pure (without anything empirical) and yet, on the one hand, intellectual, and, on 
the other, sensible. Such [a representation] is the transcendental schema. 
(A138/B177) 
                                                                                                                                           
represented among our representations are purely temporal relations, the unproblematic 
“homogeneity” of the schema with its object is secured. 
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The question now is how to understand the homogeneity of a schema with, on the one 
hand, the category, and, on the other, a sensible object. With respect to the former, Kant 
is not especially helpful: “now a transcendental time-determination is homogeneous with 
the category (which constitutes its unity) insofar as it is universal and rests on a rule a 
priori” (A138/B177). But since all schemata are universal a priori rules this does not 
explain why a schema is homogenous specifically with the category of which it is the 
schema. However, we already have at hand an account of the homogeneity, specifically, 
of schemata and the categories that they schematize: Subsumption Sufficiency. 
Subusming1 an object under a schema is sufficient for subsuming1 it under the 
corresponding concept. Combined with Subsumption Link, this entails that explaining 
the possibility of subsuming2 an object under a category reduces to the more tractable 
problem of explaining the possibility of subsuming2 it under the corresponding schema. 
So the deeper issue is the homogeneity of objects and schemata. 
On exactly this point, Kant writes:  
[the schema] is, on the other hand, homogenous with the appearance insofar as time is 
contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Thus an application of 
the category to appearances will be possible by means of the transcendental time-
determination, which, as the schema of the concept of the understanding, makes the 
subsumption of the latter under the former possible. (A138–9/B177–8) 
Drawing on the example of the plate and my account of schemata as transcendental time-
determinations from Part One, a schema will be “homogenous” with sensible objects if 
the temporal relations determinately1 represented in the schema are specifications of the 
relevant form of intuition itself: time. If they are, then the content of the schema will 
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stand to intuitable features in the same unproblematic relation that <round> stands to 
roundness in objects. 
 I will first consider the schema of quantity. Referring back to Figure IV, the schema 
of a determinate magnitude represents temporal relations among individual stages of a 
process of enumeration, individual representational of acts of identifying parts in a 
collection (the collection being enumerated). These temporal relations are what I have 
called “intuitive features”: relations of before and after. Earlier stages of the enumeration 
are “completed” by later stages: the kth stage is only the kth stage of the enumeration of a 
collection of n objects if it follows previous stages of enumerating 1 . . . (k-1)th parts and 
is followed by later stages of enumerating the (k+1)th . . . nth parts and the subject of 
enumeration is self-consciously aware of these temporal relations. Again, I take these 
temporal relations to be intuitive features unproblematically homogenous with their 
conceptual representation by the relevant schema. Given Subsumption Sufficiencyemp 
(see §4) and Subsumption Link, it follows that subsuming2 objects under theses concepts 
is possible. This explains why it is possible to subsume2 objects under quantitative 
schemata. 
Without repeating my whole account of the schema of quality we can see relatively 
easily why it refers only to intuitive features of objects and our representations of them. 
The schema of quality is the self-conscious representation of the matter of one’s 
intuition, its sensory content, as being continuously decreasable to its total absence (=0) 
and arbitrarily increasable. This requires representing one’s intuition of the object as 
standing in a certain relation to possible past and future intuitions, namely the relation of 
having a greater or lesser degree of that sensory reality in them. The temporal relations 
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are clearly what I have called “intuitive features” and thus generate no inhomogeneity 
and no problem of subsumption2. But the specifically sensory relations of possessing 
more or less of a particular kind of sensory matter are also (relational) intuitive features. 
Solely in virtue of being objects of inner sense, our inner states possess a matter. That is 
to say, it follows from the form of inner sense that inner states possess matter (but of 
course it does not follow which matter they possess). Likewise, it follows from the very 
form of space that intuited objects have some shape or other, but not which fully 
determinate shape they possess. And just as it follows from the very form of space that 
one spatial object can be larger than another, and this relation of largeness is 
continuously gradable (there is no “next largest” object), it follows from the form of 
inner sense that the sensory matter in one state can be “greater” than the sensory matter 
in another state and that this relation of “greater” is continuously gradable. Thus, in 
representing relations of continuous gradability in the sensory content of our inner states, 
the schema of <reality> represents exclusively features that objects and the sensory 
states by which they are given are able to possess solely in virtue of the form of our 
(inner) intuition. Again, I take these to be intuitive features unproblematically 
homogenous with their relevant schemata. This explains why it is possible to subsume2 
objects under qualitative schemata. 
The schemata of geometrical, quantitative, and qualitative concepts are, to some 
extent, the easy case for Kant’s theory for these are concepts of features objects have 
solely qua intuited: they are spatial (geometry), denumerable (quantitative), and possess 
continuous degrees of sensory content (qualitative). The hard case for Kant will be the 
categories of relation. Since in Section 6 I only explained the schema of <substance> I 
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will here limit myself to explaining why the subsumption2 of sensible objects under that 
schema is unproblematic. I hope it will be clear to the reader how to extend this account 
to the other relational schemata (<cause-effect>, <reciprocal action>).  
Recall the schema that Kant gives for <substance>: “the schema of substance is the 
persistence of the real in time, that is, the representation of it as the substratum of 
empirical time-determination in general, which therefore remains when everything else 
changes [wechselt]” (A144/B183). As I observed in §6, <substance> is explicitly 
schematized in terms of a previous category, <reality>. In the context of explaining the 
subsumption2 of objects under schemata, this recursive structure takes on an added 
significance, for it means that, if it is explicable why objects can be subsumed2 under the 
schema of <reality> then, to the extent that <substance> is schematized in terms of 
<reality>, to that extent subsumption under <substance> is also explicable. 
But there is more to the schema of <substance> than merely this reference back to 
<reality>. Representing an object of intuition as a substance also involves representing it 
as permanently present, as existing at all times. This means representing that past and 
future intuitions, at any time, might be intuitions of the very same objects. This requires 
representing two kinds of relations: (i) purely temporal relations among possible and 
actual intuitions (before, after) at any time, and (ii) the relation of co-referring, of being 
intuitions of one and the same object. I take it that it is now clear that (i) involves what I 
have been calling “intuitive features,” features that objects can possess solely in virtue of 
the form of intuition. Solely in virtue of the form of inner sense, the states (intuitions) by 
which objects are given to us can be before, after, and simultaneous with one another. So 
the subsumption2 of our representations of objects under (i) is unproblematic. It calls for 
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no additional explanation because it involves no “heterogeneity” between a sensible 
object and an intellectual concept. In the previous section I argued that co-reference is 
also an intuitive relational features of intuitions. Since the schema of <substance> 
involves representing reality and the possibility of co-referring intuitions occurring at 
any time, and all of these are either features, the subsumpion2 of which has already been 
explained, or intuitive features (or so I have argued), I conclude that the real possibility 
of subsuming2 an object under the schema of <substance> stands in no need of further 
explanation. By Subsumpion Sufficiencysub and Sumbsumption Link it follows that the 
real possibility of subsuming2 a sensible object under <substance> is also thereby 
explained.  
I anticipate some resistance to the claim that co-reference is an intuitive feature of 
intuitions. In particular, some readers will object that this is incompatible with Kant’s 
procedure in the Analogies, in which he argues that in order to represent a temporal order 
in spatial objects distinct from the subjective temporal order of our perceptions of them, 
we must use the relational categories of <substance-accident>, <cause-effect>, and 
<reciprocal action>.107 But this does not conflict with my interpretation at all. By 
claiming that co-reference is an intuitive relational feature of intuitions I am claiming, 
not that we can represent it without concepts (of course we cannot), but that the 
subsumption2 relation between two co-referring intuitions and <co-reference> requires 
no further explanation. Perhaps the worry, then, is not that my view is incompatible with 
the Analogies, but that it evacuates them of any significance, for it might seem that all of 
                                                
107 See Tolley 2017 for a discussion of the distinction between intuition and perception 
(Wahrnehmung). For the sake of space, I will not go into that difference here. 
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the significant work has already been done in the Schematism, on my reading. But I do 
not think this correct either. On my reading, the role of the Schematism is to explain how 
it is really possible for sensible objects to be subsumed2 under the categories, including 
the relational categories. The role of the Analogies is to argue that it is necessary to 
subsume2 sensible outer objects under the relational categories in order to represent them 
as standing in temporal relations in principle distinct from the temporal relations of our 
perceptions of them. Thus, on my reading, a substantial difference between these two 
sections remains. 
Now is also perhaps the time to respond to an objection that some readers will have 
wanted to raise since the Introduction. I have explained why subsumption1 and 
subsumption2 of sensible objects under categories is possible, namely, by means of 
subsumption1 and subsumption2 of sensible objects under schemata. But why doesn’t the 
same problem arise at the level of schemata? Don’t we need a “third” representation to 
mediate the subsumption of sensible objects under schemata (thus generating an infinite 
regress)? No, I claim, because the source of the “need” for schemata was not a general 
demand for a mediating representation between sensible objects and representations 
under which they are subsumed (in either sense); it was the fact that categories are not 
homogenous with sensible objects. Kant then provides schemata for empirical concepts 
and mathematical concepts. While these concepts are not merely concepts of intuitive 
features, it is relatively easy to schematize them in terms of intuitive features. But no 
schema or other mediating representation is required or even possible for the 
subsumption (in either sense) of a sensible object with an intuitive feature under the 
concept of that intuitive feature (e.g. the roundness of the plate and <round>). Here we 
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hit explanatory bedrock: our capacity to think of an object with an intuitive feature under 
a concept of that feature (to subsume1 it) and the real possibility of such an object falling 
under such a concept (its being subsumed2).108 I have argued that the problem of the 
subsumption2 of categories under schemata ultimately reduces to the problem of 
subsuming2 them under schemata specified in terms of sensible features. That is to say, it 




I began with what I take to be the uncontroversial, if somewhat unfamiliar, truth that: 
Subsumption  Link: if subsuming1 an object under a concept F is sufficient to subsume1 
that very object under a concept F* then explaining the real possibility of the 
subsumption2 of objects under F is sufficient to explain the real possibility of the 
subsumption2 of objects under F*. 
                                                
108 With respect to subsumption1 I take Kant’s point in the immediately preceding 
section, “On the transcendental power of judgment” to be that the capacity to (reliably) 
subsume1 sensible objects under concepts of their intuitive features is the properly 
functioning power of judgment itself, and stands in need of no further explanation. For 
instance, a student who cannot reliably subsume1 sensible objects under concepts of their 
intuitive features cannot be instructed by further rules (which, by hypothesis, he would 
not reliably apply) but only by examples, and if the power of judgment is not functioning 
(if the student lacks “mother wit”) then even these will not succeed. See A133–4/B173–
4. 
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The idea was this: if I can prove the real possibility of sensible objects instantiating F 
(being subsumed2 under F) then I can prove the real possibility of the truth of the thought 
Fx (for at least some sensible objects). But if the thought that Fx is sufficient for the 
thought that F*x (subsuming1 x under F is sufficient for subsuming1 x under F*) then by 
proving the real possibility that Fx I have thereby proved the real possibility that F*x. 
Then I reconstructed Kant’s argument for the following claim, with respect to various 
categories and their schemata: 
Subsumption Sufficiency: subsuming1 a sensibly given object under a schema is 
sufficient for subsuming1 that object under the corresponding category. 
Finally, I argued that, with respect to that very same range of schemata: 
Real Possibility: there is an explanation of the real possibility of the subsumption2 of 
sensible objects under schemata. 
From these three principles it follows that: 
Conclusion: there is an explanation of the real possibility of the subsumption2 of 
sensible objects under categories. 
Since, on my reading, the primary aim of the Schematism is precisely to explain the real 
possibility of the subsumption2 of objects under categories, it follows that, if we grant 
Kant the three previous premises (one of which, I have argued, is nearly trivial) then the 
Schematism succeeds. I have further attempted to vindicate Kant’s entitlement to the two 
substantial premises, Subsumption Sufficiency and Real Possibility. I have argued that 
these are plausible claims for Kant to make, given the transcendental theory of cognition 
for which he has argued up to this point in the CPR. Thus, my conclusion must be 
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appropriately tempered: to the extent that the previous arguments of the CPR are sound, 
the Schematism is as well.109 
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